Obstacles and Hopes:
Perspectives for Democratic Development in El Salvador

by Edelberto Torres-Rivas
and Mirta González-Suárez



San José , June 1994

Executive Summary:

      Obstacles and Hopes: Perspectives for Democratic Development in El Salvador is an analysis of the prospects for democratic development in a country scarred by a civil war that lasted almost 12 years, with a history of authoritarian rule, social exclusion, and extreme poverty. The effects of the 1980s economic crisis, felt all over Latin America, were much more acute in El Salvador where the existing levels of misery and exclusion were exacerbated.

      Democratic consolidation is examined from the perspective of a developing democracy whose pivotal point is the daily evolution of respect for human rights as defined operationally in the project "Human Rights and Democratic Governance", by the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development in Canada, for whom this report was written.

      Part One of the document summarizes the nature of the research project and its theoretical and methodological aspects.

      Part Two briefly analyzes the roots of the Salvadoran crisis and proposes, by way of a general explanation of the crisis, the effects on the population of incomplete modernization induced from abroad in a society that systematically produced exclusions at all levels where modernization was attempted. Thus the direct causes of the civil war were not only backwardness and poverty but also the way modernization was introduced, which heightened differences and, above all, made them more visible.

      Part Three briefly discusses the civil war and its effects, as well as the electoral processes from 1982 on. Life in El Salvador in the 1980s was characterized by simultaneous attempts at political stabilization through the vote, repeated efforts to pacify the country, and a fratricidal war. Violations of human rights were daily and on a mass scale. After ten years of bloody, destructive conflict, it became clear that the solution would not be military but political. The futility of armed struggle led, after many attempts, to the signing of the Peace Accords at Chapultepec in January 1992. 80,000 Salvadorans died in the war and a good part of the infrastructure of services was destroyed; over one million people left the country and almost half a million others were forced to move elsewhere in the country.

      The attempt at political stabilization through elections began with a constituent assembly and a new Constitution (1982). There followed seven elections for members of the Legislative Assembly, mayors and the president. Two civilian governments (and parties) were elected: first José Napoleón Duarte, a Christian Democrat, and then Alfredo Cristiani, from a new right-wing party called ARENA.

      Part Four goes into some detail about the fulfilment in 1992-1993 of the Peace Accords, a commitment involving not only the FMLN and the government but the whole of Salvadoran society. The Accords outlined the perspective of a democratic and peaceful society. This is the longest part of the report because all the points in the Accords are touched on.

      It is important, for example, to mention the findings of the Truth Commission, which was an effort to reconstruct from the collective memory the brutal murders committed by the Armed Forces and paramilitary groups as well as the excesses of the guerrilla forces. Also important are the efforts to disarm the FMLN and reduce the size of the Army, the disappearance of two police forces charged with committing violence against the population, the founding of the National Civil Police, the operations of the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman and of COPAZ, all with United Nations support.

      An analysis of the Peace Accords highlights contradictory results and underscores the difficulties of overcoming the authoritarian past in a short period of time. Various agreements have had to be rescheduled and others have been postponed in a context that was determined by the election campaign until April 1994. In this section we mention political assassinations, threats and other acts of force that marred the climate of the political campaign as well as the growing insecurity provoked by a rocketing increase in crime.

      We discuss the "elections of the century" (March-April 1994), in which the organization of the FMLN took part for the first time in Salvadoran history. The elections were won, in the second round, by Armando Calderón Sol, from ARENA. The FMLN and its allies emerged as the second political force. The period prior to the elections was witness to a revival of the worst signs of political violence, the resurgence of the death squads and insecurity in the cities.

      Part Four also examines the most important aspects of building a democratic society such as the right to security and social participation, the right to welfare and to non-discrimination in its various forms. In a society used to political violence, the observance of standards and procedures to ensure respect for human rights becomes especially important. We have included information gleaned from many in situ interviews with prominent Salvadorans on the subjects of the Peace Accords, political life, the challenges of developing democracy, and so forth; this is a descriptive section with documentary value.

      Part Five contains a series of provisional conclusions and recommendations. The conclusions attempt to include a summary of the research project and indicate that present in Salvadoran society are three transitions, all occurring simultaneously but each at a different pace. The first is from civil war to peace and national reconciliation; the second, the transition from an agricultural economy, with a small industrial base protected by the state, to an open, market-based economy attempting to break into the global market. The third is the transition from authoritarian-military life to a democratic and participatory society.

      The challenge involved in this daunting effort is that the job must be done by the same social and political actors who took part in or suffered the crisis: the Salvadorans; and it must be done using the scanty human and material resources available and with the bitterness and pain caused by the bloody war. The report as a whole and the conclusions in particular are permeated with a measure of cautious optimism laced with hope, because the departure point to build democracy and to have human rights respected is very poor. Nevertheless, the relative achievements of the past two years clearly reflect a will to change, although it is contradictory and incomplete; they also highlight the enormous difficulties to be overcome.

      The recommendations are undoubtedly difficult to achieve. El Salvador will not be able to reach some of the most important objectives of peace and democracy without international economic solidarity. In the new climate following the ARENA win, with the confidence the business sector now has since it is in full political control, foreign aid must set new goals on the basis of the experiences of the past 18 months of peace and the previous ten years of war. We raise three points that require urgent attention but with a perspective of long-term development:

  1. Overcoming poverty through a program of sustainable development.
  2. Overcoming violence as a form of expression of repressive power in the home, in civil society and the state.
  3. Overcoming non-participation in decision making at all social levels, with no discrimination by gender, socio-economic status, religion, ethnic group, ideology or geographic area, thereby overcoming the anti-rural bias that has existed so often.

     The main points to develop in the short term are:

  • Training or education in democratic and national reconciliation practices.
  • Defence of human rights and legal protection.
  • Strengthening of organizing and social participation mechanisms.

      What is important about any project is that it strengthen forms of participation by civil society, which is why the NGOs, when reorganized, have a major role to play. Foreign aid should rely on them.

     San José, June 30, 1994



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