THE DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT EXERCISE:
TERMS OF REFERENCE AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
JULY, 1996
A discussion paper
By: Nancy Thede
In collaboration with:
Alain Bissonnette
Stéphanie Rousseau
Antonio José Almeida
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. The Approach
ICHRDD has carried out since 1993 a series of studies and
workshops in several of its core countries as a basis for strategic
decision-making regarding its activities. The studies were initially
based on a "democratic development framework" developed by Mr.
Edward Broadbent, President of the International Centre, and David
Gillies, which has become in a sense a trademark of the Centre and,
as such, has been widely discussed with other institutions involved
in supporting democratic development initiatives. (1)
With the experience of five completed study-workshop
processes and two others underway (2) and the external evaluation
of three of the completed processes, a sufficient quantity of material
has become available to undertake a critical assessment of the work
to date and to formulate a more integrated overall approach on the
basis of the lessons learned.
The Link Between Human Rights and Democratic Development
The idea of a necessary link between respect for the full range
of human rights and the existence of an effectively democratic
society was the major original contribution of the ICHRDD
democratic development framework when it was first developed.
Even now, despite much wider-spread acknowledgment of such a
link by the international community, most partner organisations in
the South continue to consider that link to be an innovative and
useful approach for their own work.
Many other institutions - state and non-governmental,
Canadian and international - have in the past few years also begun to
dedicate specific resources to conceptualising approaches and
executing programming in the field of human rights and democratic
development. There exists thus a growing bodyof policy documents
on the subject, although there is still little inter-institutional sharing
and few attempts at constructing an overview. Moreover, there has
been little attempt to construct a common vision of the problem:
hence, each institution proceeds to define "democracy" from its own
institutional perspective and priorities, so that the instruments and
approaches adopted demonstrate a great disparity of concepts and
criteria. Although the Centre's approach will continue to be based on
its priority to civil society in the democratisation process, and by its
view of democracy as a social process and not simply a series of
institutions, it sees itself as one participant amongst many on the
international scene dealing with these issues. It therefore understands
that this analytical framework should be treated as an invitation to
discussion and debate, in a context where international organisations
are beginning to call for a "common framework of understanding of
the specific country context" in joint efforts to support
democratisation (see OECD 1995).
2. ICHRDD's Objectives in the Democratic Development Exercise
The Centre's overall goal
in this initiative is to support and
promote the process of democratic development in specific core
countries.
The Centre, contrary to many other institutions, emphasises
both terms of the phrase democratic development. Democracy is seen
as encompassing both the normative, or institutional aspects of
governance, as well as the social praxis or exercise of effective
citizen participation in determining the priorities and orientation of
public policy. Development is seen as a political process of decision-making by both State and civil society actors leading to the effective
mobilisation of economic, social and cultural resources for a just
process of socially negotiated creation and distribution of wealth and
power that attempts to respect the entire family of human rights. The
human person is the central subject of development.
In the phrase "democratic development", the emphasis is
usually put on one of the two terms, thus underemphasising the
other. Democratic development tends to be taken as the design and
functioning of the institutions of governance. Democratic
development is most often considered to be the process of
empowerment of the marginalised sectors of society in the economic
decision-making that affects them. As we have seen above, the
Centre's insistence on maintaining a holistic approach to each of the
two terms as well as on the meaningful link between the two, is in
itself an innovation and a contribution to the debate.
The objective of the democratic development initiatives in the
Centre is to design and implement a coherent process of analysis of
the trends affecting democratic development in any given country,
and of formulation of the key strategic problems within which to
focus support. (3)
The Centre's support can be directed to actors from the State
or from civil society, or both. However, the Centre has clearly opted
for a criterion of priority to strengthening civil society in its choices
of resource allocation. Civil society is seen as the major long-term
guarantee of democratic development. As well, in most cases civil
society is under-resourced to play an influential role in democratic
development. In cases where support is given to State institutions,
the decision is informed by the strategic priority of reinforcing civil
society (i.e.: in order to move forward an issue that is obstructing
effective participation in or by civil society, or respect by the State
of the role of civil society).
The definition of strategic priorities for support to democratic
development is conceived of as a process involving several stages,
each of which arrives at a particular product, which in turn feeds into
the following stage. The objective of the process is not the product
in itself, and both process and product can and should be redefined
as a function of the dynamic generated around the initiative. In short,
the initiative is an on-going work-in-progress which evolves through
the following stages:
- a) the definition of a common analytical framework;
- b) a phase of research using the common framework;
- c) socialisation of the analysis and participatory strategising;
- d) programme support to the implementation of the strategies
defined.
The process envisaged is not, however, the same in every case:
on the contrary, it is meant to be flexible and iterative, reflecting our
evolving knowledge and experience and adapting itself to the
specifics of each country case. Within the scope of this initiative, the
Centre intends to involve key actors in the democratisation process
as participants in the analysis and outcome of the democratic
development work.
3. The Concepts
Civil Society
The analytical approach chosen by the Centre is informed by its
strategic bias in favour of civil society, that is: its conviction that
civil society is the key element in determining whether or not an
effectively democratic society exists. Civil society may exist without
democracy, but democracy cannot exist without a strong civil society
(Broadbent, 1993b). The Centre regards civil society as "the sum of
all non-family social institutions and associations in a country" which
are autonomous, independent of the State and capable of significantly
influencing public policy (Taylor, 1990). Civil society thus includes
churches, business organisations, NGOs, trade unions, citizens'
groups, the media, etc. Political parties, as they play a double role -
partly within the State and partly within civil society - can be
considered part of civil society in certain contexts and with respect
to certain issues. In particular, in their role as promoters and
generators of public debate on and mobilisation around policy issues,
political parties play an active part in civil society. They also act as
mediators between citizens and the State, and can therefore be an
important locus for promotion of democracy when the nature of the
relationship between State and civil society is at issue. They are as
well the means by which an individual can move from being a citizen
in civil society to a citizen holding power in government.
The family as such is not considered here to be an organisation
belonging to civil society. It must however be examined in the light
of its extremely important role in learning and socialisation, and
often as an environment favouring the realisation of the human
person. The fact that the family is not considered to be part of civil
society does not deny its crucial importance as a locus of the
realisation or violation of the human rights of its members,
particularly women and children. The family is rarely an actor as
such on the public policy scene, but it must be subjected to specific
scrutiny as an institution that promotes, denies or violates rights of
certain of its members, and as an institution whose structure and
functioning are determined by public policy, sometimes to a great
extent. (4) Due respect to cultural norms and practices
notwithstanding, two major international conventions protect rights
within the family (International Convention on the Rights of the
Child; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women), and as such represent an
international consensus on standards of treatment and behaviour in
the "private sphere".
However, despite the fact that the family - or the "private
sphere" in general - is not part of civil society, the very concept of
"civil society" designates a zone of interaction between the "public"
and "private" spheres: it "indicates the role of the private sphere'
in the gestation of conditions for collective public' action, and in the
reproduction of the political and social order" (Vilas 1993). In the
evolution of the modern state, civil society preceeded democracy.
Indeed, there are today states with civil societies that themselves
function undemocraticly.
Democratic civil societies have at least three important
characteristics:
- - civil associations are politically independent of the State;
- - a culture of tolerance and dialogue prevails;
- - all adult men and women have equal political rights, and,
among them, the right to choose and reject their
governors.
Moreover, the relationship between State and civil society in
a strong democracy is characterised by substantive equality of access
to the State for all groups without discrimination based on gender,
race, religion or ideology (Broadbent, 1993b; Rueschemeyer, 1992).
Language and other factors should also be taken into consideration
as potentiel factors of discrimination.
It must be recognised, however, that different groups within
civil society in reality have unequal access and potential to influence
public policy. In general, organisations representing the
economically and socially marginalised sectors of society have less
voice than the business sector, which most often has a privileged
relationship with the State. Three measures of a group's influence
are:
- - ability to influence the setting of the agenda of public
policy;
- - ability to influence the policy process;
- - ability to influence policy outcomes.
The ability to influence is in turn affected by factors internal to the
group (its human and financial resources, its organisational capacity,
its advocacy skills), but also by the level of tolerance and interaction
amongst diverse sectors of civil society (capacity to form alliances
and coalitions, to set common objectives for policy advocacy,
etc.).
Strong democratic civil societies are made, not born, though,
and that "making of a democratic civil society" has no culminating
point. The characteristics referred to above as being indicative of a
strong and democratic civil society are actually all processes in
themselves: on-going organisation within all sectors of society;
continual construction and redefinition of their political autonomy
with respect to the State; broadening and reconstructing tolerance
and dialogue; ensuring and defending equality of access to the State
as well as greater equality within civil society.
Democratic Development
The assessment of the level and quality of democratic development
existent in a given country must take into account then the trends on
four distinct levels:
- - first, as mentioned above, in the structure and vitality of
civil society;
- - second, in the institutionalisation of norms and practices of
democratic governance;
- - third, in the creation and effectiveness of mechanisms of
input, communication and dialogue between the State and
civil society (including on-going institutionalised access to
the State for civil society, and means of systematic citizen
monitoring of State policy decisions and implementation);
- - fourth, in the power the majority within civil society have
vis-à-vis powerful minorities (for example, workers
with respect to the holders of corporate power in societies
with market economies).
The Centre's approach to democratic development is based on
the premise that full respect for the entire bodyof human rights is a
necessary condition of a fully functioning democracy. It is a
sufficient condition only if we consider human rights not only from
the point of view of their formal recognition and promotion by the
State but also from that of their effective exercise by civil society
and citizens. Norms may well exist, but it is the social practice with
respect to those norms that is crucial for the effective existence of
democracy. (5) Rights are historically generated in processes specific
to each society, and as such they are not only a product of, but an
integral constitutive element of democracy.
Citizenship
In this connection, the notions of citizen and citizenship are
fundamental. The citizen is the active subject of civil society. A
modern notion of citizenship must reconcile the notion of republican
"common good" with the liberal emphasis on pluralism. Citizenship
does not abolish class conflict or diversity, but it is predicated on
implicit "agreement that the "public interest" does exist and that the
parties have the right to participate in its elaboration and in the
obligation of submission to society's laws" (Leca, 1992). Notions of
citizenship such as Hannah Arendt's (cf. Entrevès, 1992),
see "the practice of citizenship as being intimately linked to the
existence of a public sphere where members of civil society can exist
as citizens and act collectively to resolve democratically the issues
concerning their life in the political community". However, other
authors (Leca, 1992) point out that citizenship can only exist "if
there is a social space between the public and private spheres...
Citizenship depends on two simultaneous developments: the
autonomous mobilization of interests, which is an expression of a
limited social pluralism, and the communal participation in the
activities of the political centre, which is an expression of a
widespread and stable devotion to the symbols of the community."
This intermediate sphere, located between the private and the public
spheres, is precisely the domain of civil society.
The concept of citizenship and in particular, the notion of the
role of the responsible citizen has recently become a subject of much
debate and creative thinking within civil society. Especially in
countries of the South that are experiencing important democratic
openings, the idea of the role of the citizen as an active and decisive
participant in democratic reconstruction of society and the State
represents a radical departure from previous stances. Formerly, the
overwhelming tendency was to consider the State and government to
be in charge of and responsible for the destiny of society. Although
that view persists in many cases, the emerging trend is towards
exploring the individual and collective responsibility of citizens, by
virtue of their citizenship, for the recognition and respect of
rights.
The State has a specific role to play with respect to the
development of citizenship, despite the fact that citizenship is, as we
have seen above, largely autonomous from the realm of the State. It
is the State's responsibility nonetheless to cultivate the notion of
citizenship and its implications for citizen behaviour amongst the
population.
Transition to Democracy
The problem of regimes in transition from authoritarian to
democratic systems poses specific questions for the analysis of
democratic development. It is generally assumed, for example, that
modernisation and democratic institutionalisation are mutually
supportive (cf Taylor & Muntarbhorn, 1994). Nun (1993),
however, argues forcefully against the view that "modernization
designates a panacea rather than extremely complex and conflictual
transformations whose features are themselves the central object of
political struggle."
The theory of "low intensity democracy" holds particular
relevance for many of the contexts the Centre is led to deal with. Are
these apparently democratic States (many in Latin America) actually
ineluctably evolving towards democracy along with their economic
modernisation? The theory of low-intensity democracy would suggest
that they are not. Indeed, according to G. O'Donnell (1993): "A
State that is incapable of defending its legality maintains a system of
democracy of low-intensity citizenship... A situation in which one
can vote freely and be confident that the vote will be properly
scrutinised, but where one cannot expect just treatment from the
Police or from the administration of justice, all of which calls
seriously into question the liberal component of that democracy and
which gravely restricts citizenship." In such cases where it can be
reasonably demonstrated that there is no movement on the State level
towards a fully democratic system of governance, the Centre's
strategy for support to democratic development will reflect that by
concentrating its collaborative efforts exclusively within civil society,
and by working to generate as much pressure as possible from the
international community towards that State.
At the same time, the extension of participation rights that in
general accompanies political modernisation by the same token
establishes the legitimacy of political dissent and confrontation. As
Nun (1993) again remarks, "Participation is an «essentially
contested» category, not a talisman, and the identities and autonomies
it may promote... are neither absolute nor constituted once and for
all: they are subject to redefinition and negotiation, and conflict is
inherent in them." As a major site of participation, civil society itself
is a conflictual space which, in its more recent expressions, also
reflects a "broadening of the socio-cultural reference points for
collective action" (Vilas 1993).
In an international environment that tends to equate
"liberalisation" and "democratisation" (6), the argument (cf.
Broadbent, 1996) that the neoliberal model of a market economy is
structurally incapable of defending and actualising the full family of
human rights, requires analytical attention. In a context of
globalisation, the Centre must work together with its partners on the
development and promotion of a model of market economy which
maximises, rather than undermines, rights. Such an approach flows
from the Centre's commitment to democracy as a model of society
and not simply as a model of State.
4. The Democratic Development Exercise
The process as conceived for the purposes of the ICHRDD,
involves four distinct and consecutive phases, each of which provides
feedback for the other three and for the process as a whole. It is in
that sense a work-in-progress. Each phase is designed to respond to
specific objectives.
Phase 1: The Analytical Framework
This analytical framework consists of a series of six categories
of rights representing the entire range of human rights, to be
examined in the light of the concepts of democracy, civil society and
citizenship outlined above. Its application in a dynamic manner
should treat each category of rights as a field of interaction in which
sectors of civil society constitute themselves and the democratic
institutions within which they evolve.
The analytical framework is accompanied by a table of criteria
(7) to be used as a tool for assessing state recognition of and respect
for the entire range of rights. The table is not to be taken as a
graphic representation of the framework as a whole.
A. The Categories
The criteria used are grouped into six interdependent
categories: participation, security, well-being, non-discrimination,
collectivities and democratic institutions (8) (itself subdivided into
"state institutions" and "rule of law"). The categories are each
rendered more explicit by subdivision into a series of criteria drawn
from international human rights instruments, thus highlighting key
issues in the recognition and implementation of rights. Each category
and each criterion can be used to examine the circumstances of any
sub-group within society (based for example on distinctions such as
gender, age, social class, ethnic group). The human rights criteria
used are drawn from the following instruments:
- - the International Bill of Human Rights (comprising the
Universal Declaration and the Covenants on Civil and
Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights), which is the standard reference for all human rights
assessments;
- - the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which adds legal
and normative weight to the Centre's emphasis on women's
rights;
- - the Declaration on the Right to Development, which adds
the dimension of international political economy to our
overview;
- - ILO Convention 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples in Independent Countries, which constitutes the only
internationally-recognised instrument in this field. Although
it does not touch on the issue of self-determination, it does
specify the obligations of states regarding a broad spectrum
of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of
indigenous peoples.
Where appropriate, regional human rights instruments should
also be incorporated into the analysis.
The corpus of international and regional human rights
instruments is diverse. As many as 60 separate rights may be derived
from them. A comprehensive examination of the full range of rights
is neither feasible nor necessary. Instead, this series draws on a
representative set of proxies. The criteria chosen are neither
arbitrary, nor beyond dispute. Although reasonable people may
differ on the priority to be accorded different sets of rights, the
Centre has chosen to accord equal importance to each criterion. No
attempt is made to privilege one category of rights over another,
develop an ordinal ranking system for specific criteria, or a
cumulative scorecard (compare Carter Center, 1992; Humana, 1986;
Gastil, 1991; UNDP, 1992).
Each criterion was chosen for its central contribution to what
the UN Charter calls "the dignity and worth of the human person".
This emphasis also resonates with the Centre's conception of
democratic development. The ultimate purpose of democratic
development is to maximise human potential through the active
participation of citizens in controlling their own destinies, within the
respect of duties towards others and towards the collectivity.
This selection of criteria also underlines the indivisibility and
interdependence of all human rights (9). That is why they are drawn
from all points of the human rights compass: civil, political,
economic, social and cultural. Taken together, the criteria are
representative of those rights that make a life of dignity and meaning
possible. By the same token, the absence or abuse of any one
criterion diminishes the prospects for the dignity of the human
person or group. Hence "political participation can be meaningless
without adequate security of the person; it can be very restricted in
its scope if discrimination is rife in society; it can appear close to
meaningless where basic welfare needs are not met" (Taylor &
Muntarbhorn, 1994). In the same way, the degree of actualisation of
women's rights as human rights in a society is an indicator of the
quality of its democracy.
The grid entitled "Criteria and Indicators of a Democratic
Society", which accompanies this text, is conceived as an analytical
tool, but does not purport to be the graphic representation of the
analytical approach proposed in the narrative text. Notably, the grid
covers aspects of rights norms and practices that are the domain of
the State: it does not purport to reflect the issues and practices
prevalent within civil society. Civil society, its actors, practices and
issues, given their extreme complexity, do not lend themselves well
to representation in a simplified grid form, but will be fully
developed within the narrative text.
Following is a more detailed explanation of the categories of
criteria used and of the issues to be examined in each.
i) Participation
This category addresses the quality of citizen participation both on
the level of the democratic institutions of the State (elections,
multiparty system, government accountability, etc.) and within civil
society (as described above). Three key civil liberties are the
participatory rights to free expression, free association and free
assembly. Two other participation rights enable citizens to "take part
in government" either "directly or through freely chosen
representatives". Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights goes on to affirm that:
The will of the people shall be the basis of authority of
government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and
genuine elections which shall be by universal suffrage and
shall be held by secret vote...
This "take part" clause points beyond elections to a more
expansive notion of a strong civil society capable of significantly
influencing public policy. The "take part" clause underlines the
programmatic character of participation. Although "dormant or
imprisoned within a hostile environment", the norm is a spur to
protest with "subversive potential" (Steiner, 1988: 136). Direct
participation through voting in local and national elections is a
fundamental act of political participation. It measures three things:
popular consent in the choice of decision-makers; competitiveness
and fairness (particularly of electoral laws, political parties and
electoral outcomes); and inclusiveness (universal or restricted
suffrage). But voting and elections also have implications for any
analysis of the health of political institutions, such as electoral
commissions, the judiciary and the civil service.
The presence, absence, improvement or decay of the three
civil liberties of free speech, assembly and association help measure
the State's disposition towards civil society. The freedom to organise
is key for democratic participation. It affects the prospects for the
political expression of most elements of civil society: from political
parties to development NGOs, from religious organisations to
chambers of commerce. Independent trade unions can only flourish
where there is substantive freedom of association and the right to
strike. Trade union rights should be a key research focus both
because of the important role the labour movement has played in the
development of many modern democracies, and because such rights
straddle both covenants and are the focus of many ILO conventions
to which states may be party (Rueschemeyer et al., 1992). By the
same token, NGOs as key development actors need an enabling
environment for their work. Assessments should thus be made of any
restrictive State legislation or policies towards NGOs, particularly as
concerns their ability to act in an advocacy capacity.
Finally, freedom of expression, access to information from the
public and the private spheres and the right to communicate are at
the core of the idea of democracy. An independent media, both in
terms of ownership and expression, is essential for informed political
choice and wide public debate of alternative policies. Public access
to the media, both in terms of production and consumption, should
also be examined. Moreover, a vigourous democracy's lifeblood is
in the existence of a vital public sphere where all citizens, including
the most underprivileged, are allowed and encouraged to express
their views.
Specific characteristics of the participation of women must be
recognised and analysed. Above and beyond a statistical examination
of levels of political participation by women (participation in
elections, both as voters and candidates, proportion of women
parliamentarians and high-level civil servants, number of women in
influential positions in civil society organisations, etc.), the structural
determinants of women's participation should be identified. For
instance, do women's roles in the private sphere inhibit them from
political participation? Do attitudes towards women constitute a
barrier to their public role? Over and above that, do women and their
concerns succeed in influencing public policy? Do women have an
attitude towards power and authority that is different from that of
men and which therefore affects the type and amount of their
participation in the public sphere?
ii) Security
This category is used to assess the level of individual and group
security. When the right to life and freedom from torture are violated
systematically, all other individual and group rights are at risk.
Freedom from extra-judicial killings (including forced
disappearance) and torture are non-derogable rights and must not,
therefore, be violated under any circumstances, including national
emergencies. Arbitrary arrest and detention are used here to assess
the climate of individual and group security or repression, even
though both may be legally permitted by domestic legislation during
bona fide states of emergency.
As concerns women, specific problems for their physical and
psychological security exist in all societies and must be analysed
specifically. In the private sphere (i.e.: family) as well as the public
one, women may be subject to aggression (sexual, physical,
psychological) or the threat of aggression, which constitute specific
forms of torture. Most often these violations of women's rights are
undertaken with complete impunity. We define violence against
women in the same manner as the United Nations' Declaration on
the Elimination of Violence Against Women (A/48/629), as follows:
"any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result
in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women,
including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life." In the terms
of the Declaration also "women's opportunities to achieve legal,
social, political and economic equality in society are limited... by
continuing and endemic violence." Certain groups of women
particularly at risk are identified by the Declaration as "women
belonging to minority groups, indigenous women, refugee women,
migrant women, women living in rural or remote communities,
destitute women, women in institutions or in detention, female
children, women with disabilities, elderly women and women in
situations of armed conflict...".
iii) Well-Being
Not only are social and economic rights important for their own
sake, they are also vital for sustaining democracy and for prompting
economic growth. Empirical evidence suggests that sustained and
extreme material inequality or the absence of public policies to
redress such skewed distribution may contribute to democratic decay
(Arat, 1991). Welfare rights, once considered to be the challenge of
20th century development (Marshall, 1950), are today under duress
in both the South and the North. The neo-liberal reinterpretation of
the role of the State is fundamentally undermining economic and
social rights to start with, but also threatens the entire family of
rights (Broadbent, 1996). Economic and social rights are rendered
more precarious because the majority of States have chosen to define
less clearly their legal weight and justiciability. States are merely
enjoined by international human rights instruments to "progressively
realise" those rights. The normative and policy retreat from welfare
makes it especially relevant for ICHRDD to re-emphasise the
salience of social and economic rights for human development and
durable democratisation.
Trends in material social welfare will be assessed using the
criteria of education, health care, labour rights and environment.
These will be taken as proxies for the larger category of basic human
needs: to food and shelter, as well as to employment. Any factual
description should be supplemented by an assessment of both state
policies and international considerations, such as economic reform
packages, that promote or erode social and economic rights. This
section should also include an examination of environmental issues
as a day-to-day problem for large parts of the population of southern
countries. Erosion and large-scale industrialisation are but the tip of
the iceberg. Usually these problems affect most severely the
marginalised sectors of the population. Using international
commitments as a guideline, researchers should examine state
controls over private and public companies, as well as policy
sensitivity to environmental issues (in agricultural programmes, for
example). Also, environmental issues in the South as in the North
are a major rallying-point for social movements: what is their
position in and impact on civil society as a whole?
It should also be kept in mind that this category of rights is a
generator of social conflict and is the site of much organisation on
the part of underprivileged sectors of civil society and, as such, the
inspiration for alternative policies.
As in most countries in both the North and the South, women
constitute the majority of the poor, the category of well-being is
particularly relevant to them: any reduction in social policies hits
women first and foremost, increasing their poverty and their double
and triple burdens. Moreover, the very design and conception of
social policy in general takes into consideration at best only very
partially women's responsibilities and roles in this field. It should
also be noted that the various aspects of the issue of well-being are
especially interrelated for women: for example, when social
programmes are diminished thus increasing women's domestic
responsibilities, their ability to find and maintain salaried
employment is undermined, and their capacity to organise in order
to ensure respect for their labour rights is also negatively affected.
Access to family planning services is an important indicator of
quality of living conditions for women, since lack of such access
generally translates into higher rates of female mortality and lower
access to education. Free choice in family planning is essential for
women to be able to exercise their rights.
National and International Political Economy
During the 1980s and 1990s, the disposition and capacity of any state
to provide the full range of human rights has been markedly
influenced by the intensification of globalisation. On the positive
side, this phenomenon has brought with it increased awareness and
interaction amongst civil societies internationally, and has even
stimulated the development of an embryonic "global civil society".
The movement towards extension of market economies has, some
maintain, afforded more equal access to improved living conditions
and, by the same token, contributed to generating greater demand for
democracy from civil society. On the negative side, two related
phenomena have come into play: -1 The dominance of the neo-liberal economic
ideology to the detriment of all other possible
conceptions of a market economy has led to an exclusive insistence
on de-coupling the state from the economy and abandoning the
state's historic task of offsetting the unequal social impact of market
forces. -2 Chronic debt overhangs and economic reform packages
usually require reduced spending on welfare goods, such as
education and health care.
Structural adjustment programs brokered by international
financial institutions (IFIs) reduce states' autonomy to frame or even
debate macro-economic and social policy. This may have
consequences that undermine democratic development. Domestic
publics are often shut out of negotiations between states and powerful
IFIs. The absence of internal democratic debate and the severity of
the austerity measures may prompt social instability that threatens
democratic governance. In sum, "the erosion of the state's capacity
to respond to pressures and demands emerging from within national
territories ... is eliminating the raison d'être of political
participation as it has been traditionally conceived" (Perez, 1993).
Hence, the researchers should (a) frame their analysis of
welfare provision in the context of any extant economic reform
packages. Where appropriate they should discuss the degree to which
such packages erode the social and economic rights of the poorest;
and (b) examine the impact of IFI-brokered reform packages for the
prospects of democratic public policy making.Growth in national
income does not automatically increase the well-being of the poor.
In most countries presently considered to be experiencing a process
of democratic transition, income distribution is extremely unequal.
As a result, (c) the researchers should examine whether or how
skewed income distributions and/or land ownership reinforce an
unequal capacity for different groups and classes in society to access
and influence the political process, both at present and in the past.
How do those historically-constituted economic relationships affect
the construction of political institutions and the nature of
democracy?
iv) Non-Discrimination
The principle of non-discrimination is fundamental to the concept of
modern democracy, and it is suffused throughout the human rights
conventions, cutting across the civil-political/socio-economic fault
line. The heart of the democratic ideal is that all persons deserve to
be treated with equal respect regardless of their gender, status,
beliefs or ethnic origin. The category of non-discrimination should
apply to all rights across the board. Groups often discriminated
against are, for example: women, children, refugees, the disabled
and the elderly, migrants, rural poor and aliens (Baehr et al., 1995:
412).
An assessment of the nature and extent of discrimination is
also useful in determining political trends and as an early warning of
democratic decay. Economic and political discrimination against
linguistic, religious, ethnic or national groups may be one of the root
causes of cultural degradation and communal violence, civil war or
secession. Societies which promote and protect diversity help deepen
the traditions of tolerance, compromise, and the peaceful resolution
of conflict that are essential to democracy. Here perhaps more than
in any other category of rights, it is clear that specific policies and
practices are crucial to the realisation of the rights.
Women are again a case in point: what are the social practices
that prohibit women from acceding to equal realisation of their rights
or, alternatively, being able to determine their social priorities and
having the liberty of action to be able to execute them? Can women
make life-choices and maintain traditions of their choice without
having to pay a price in terms of reduced access to the public
sphere?
v) Rights of Collectivities
This category of rights refers principally to the issue of indigenous
and tribal peoples and minority groups.
The principle of collective self-determination is presently the
central debate regarding the formulation of the international
instruments on indigenous rights within the United Nations and
regional systems. The constitution of indigenous rights revolves
around this issue in most national contexts as well. In addition to
assessing the degree to which indigenous groups enjoy security of the
person, investigators should examine practices that lead to cultural
genocide (policies of forced integration, restrictions on language or
religion, the influx of new settlers, the impact of economic mega-projects and resettlement that may ensue, etc.).
The issue of minority rights should be analysed in terms of
their constitutional and legal recognition (who is recognised as a
minority and on what terms?). The policy framework for defining
minorities and their rights should also be confronted with the
prevailing international approaches to the issues. What kinds of
relations exist within civil society as a whole between minority and
majority groups? How do minority groups influence the public policy
debate? What in the worldview of minority groups constitutes a
creative contribution to the formulation of citizen rights and
responsibilities?
Similarly, the women of political minorities (10) must face
particular problems as women, both within their group and with
respect to the majority.
vi) Democratic Institutions
- a) State Institutions
The above categories assess the human rights and democratic
participation of civil society. They must be put in context by an
analysis of "political society" to assess the role of State institutions
in promoting or inhibiting democratic development and human
rights. Institutions such as the legislature, political parties and the
judiciary should buttress a democratic civic culture by safeguarding
and promoting human rights, holding governments accountable, and
limiting potential abuses of executive power. It must be kept in mind
that a specific assessment should be carried out of the degree and the
manner in which these institutions take account of women's rights
and issues, in particular of whether or not the State exercises due
diligence in these matters and to what extent the State assumes, as it
should, responsibility for sanctioning the actions of non-State
parties.
- b) Rule of Law
An independent and predictable legal framework is vital for orderly
commerce and for individual and group redress for rights violations.
For example, no discussion of cultural rights, personal security, or
freedom of association is possible without considering the rule of
law. As an aspect of the political institutions category, the key rule
of law issues are the independence of the judiciary from executive
influence or control, the degree to which the Constitution reflects
democratic principles and guides governmental actions, and effective
civilian control of the security forces. To what degree does the legal
framework reflect an overall concern and guarantee for gender
equality?
B. The Application of the Framework
The portraits established on each of the categories of rights
criteria should not be exclusively, nor even principally descriptive.
Clearly, selected descriptive data is necessary to frame the present
situation, but the objective of the framework is to provide strategic
analysis: to serve as a tool for identifying key issues and actors for
democratic development. A global, as well as sectoral, portrait of
civil society should emerge from the application of this framework.
An analysis of civil society as it exists in relation to each category of
the framework - its strengths and weaknesses, its actors, issues,
trends and practices - will be established. But an overall assessment
of civil society should also be given, identifying major actors,
outstanding characteristics, and trends and issues that cross-cut
sectors. The framework should be used to analyse how state and civil
society actors have, through their policies and concrete initiatives,
generated rights and how this process of rights-constitution has in
turn influenced the construction of civil society and democracy in a
given country.
The framework must therefore be applied in the following
ways:
- It is to be problem-oriented: each of the categories should
be approached as a problem. That is to say: what are the major
issues with respect to this category and how are they framed
nationally? Who are the major actors working in this field of rights?
How do they interact? What is their assessment of the impact of the
issues presented in this field on the quality of democracy and trends
towards democratisation? How has this field of State and civil society
intervention been constituted historically? What social sectors do the
major actors represent? What policy proposals are they putting
forward? What are the foreseeable trends for the future in terms of
the actors and the configuration of each field? What is the impact of
the functioning of the field itself on the constitution of civil society
(that is: how does the creation of issues and debates or struggles in
a particular field or sub-field of rights contribute over time to the
constitution of the actors themselves and how does it influence the
course of development of civil society and its views)?
- It is to be used in a gendered manner: Each category of
rights must be re-read in terms of women's experience. How are
women affected by the problems and issues arising within each
category? Are women significant actors in the field? Do other actors
promote the issues identified by women as important for them? To
what extent does a country's specific family tradition (or traditions)
contribute to or inhibit gender consciousness?
- It should identify the cultural originality of each context.
Human rights instruments are theoretically universal but they are
heavily informed by Western religious and political thought (Leroy
1994) and, moreover, every context - including our own - is
culturally and historically specific. Specific notions and practices
either legitimating or delegitimating the ideals of democracy, rights,
tolerance, etc., should be examined in each context. What are
cultural attitudes towards power and authority? Do such attitudes
differ according to gender, social class, ethnic group, age, etc.?
These cultural and historical resources for democratic development
(cf. Taylor & Muntarbhorn 1994) may constitute important cultural
capital which can be mobilised for or against democratisation.
- It should centre its analysis on dynamic trends. Each of the
categories must be situated in its historical evolution, identifying
both opportunities and constraints from this point of view.
- The framework is to be considered a flexible tool. Although
it is designed to provide a common set of criteria and concepts in
order to guarantee political and theoretical coherence to the strategic
analysis it is to generate, the framework can and should be adapted
according to the specific contexts in which it is used. Certain
categories may be given more in-depth discussion than others, if the
context so warrants. Or, if in a specific country there is clearly one
over-arching issue or theme (i.e.: set of issues) considered by major
actors to be crucial for democratic development, the application of
the framework should be adapted in accordance with that.
Phase 2: Research
The objective of the research phase is to apply the common
framework to specific country situations in order to identify strategic
issues for democratisation, which will then be actively processed
with key actors in those issues.
Our experience to date indicates that a change in our
methodology is warranted: the research and study should not be
approached as a phase separate from the formulation of strategies and
programmes, but should be developed from the outset with the
involvement of key local actors. Taking this lesson into account, the
research process will henceforward be coordinated by a researcher-animator, to be chosen in consultation with in-country partners, and
who will work in collaboration with a staff person from the Centre,
to do the following, over a period of six to eight months:
- - carry out a brief baseline analysis for discussion;
- - serve as resource-person in a two-day seminar of partners
and key contacts to apply the framework;
- - expand and develop the results of the seminar analytically
- - produce a document including strategic proposals.
The product of the research phase will be an analytical report on the
basis of the framework, for publication.
Phase 3: Socialisation
The objectives of the Centre in this phase are:
- - to socialise the results of the research phase in a way that
will contribute to strengthening State-civil society dialogue;
- - to broaden the spectrum of actors willing to promote the
joint strategies identified for addressing key issues for
democratic development
- - to deepen the commitment of the actors involved (11).
The process involves the creation of a local steering committee
composed of a cross-section of the most dynamic organisations on
the democratic development front, which will have the responsibility
of organising and holding, in collaboration with the Centre:
- - workshop(s) to discuss the findings of the research phase
and to develop a programme of action; and
- - a high-profile public event bringing together State and civil
society actors to debate aspects of the proposed programme
of action.
In order to ensure maximum socialisation of the research
results with other Canadian organisations and institutions involved in
support to democratic movements and institutions in the country at
hand, the Centre will continue to organise a one-day follow-up
workshop in Canada, to discuss the study and put out for discussion
the most provocative issues raised by it. Here also, the Centre will
make an effort to actively involve other contributors, to ensure a
productive and lively debate. Where appropriate, this discussion may
serve as the basis for developing joint initiatives with other Canadian
funders.
Phase 4: Programming
Programming strategies and orientations will flow more or less
easily out of the forum/workshop and study process, depending on
the context. Democratic development is an extremely wide field,
however, and the Centre will attempt to target its support work to
focus on its areas of expertise and interventions appropriate to its
nature as a para-governmental organisation. There are an enormous
number of non-governmental organisations, many of which are doing
excellent work in the field of support to civil society. There are also
a growing number of governmental and inter-governmental
organisations promoting democratic development as they see it.
There are, however, extremely few hybrid organisations like the
Centre, and as such the Centre can occupy a very unique and useful
niche in facilitating, promoting and structuring state-civil society
dialogue and interrelation both overseas and in Canada. Such a role
is seen by civil society in many countries as being an essential aspect
of the democratisation of their societies, and they are putting it
forward as a necessity with or without the Centre raising it as a
priority.
The Centre will also aim to concentrate its democratic
development activities within those fields in which it is developing
thematic expertise, that is to say: women, indigenous peoples,
impunity, trade and human rights. Of course, these thematic
approaches need to be flexible and adapted to each country situation,
and in some cases other approaches may prove to be more
appropriate.
The Centre's programming support will be directly linked to
the process, and one of the important aspects of programming will
be to support the very process of definition and implementation of
the process. This includes such aspects as supporting on-going
dialogue between the state and civil society and - in collaboration
with civil society actors - a strategising component, policy research
and advocacy in the field, etc. These will form the major (if not
entire) part of the programming support in the field. The democratic
development exercise will also inform the Centre's choice of long-term partners, with both the study and the strategising components
contributing to identify those who share its fundamental objectives
and are central to the strategic problems it wants to address.
Follow-up mechanisms should allow the Centre to continually
identify and feed back into the overall process and its components
the lessons learned through this experience as well as the unexpected
positive spin-offs.
The overall activities of the Centre will be informed by the
process:
- - Advocacy work will be informed by the strategic issues
identified on a country basis. These issues should be
integrated into the overall advocacy programme as part of its
objectives for influencing.
- - A communications strategy will disseminate debates and
proposals arising from each country process, with a view to
informing public opinion at large or (where appropriate)
specific decision-makers.
- - Policy interventions with international institutions will
include recommendations arising from country
strategies.
Once the cycle of studies is finished, the exercise is not over.
The Centre will undertake a follow-up study in each country three
years after the original study was finished. The purpose of the
follow-up studies will be to up-date the analysis, to identify new
strategies and partners if necessary, to challenge our growing
certainties. They will also play an evaluative role by attempting to
assess the degree of relevance of the programme as it exists at that
point.
The Centre hopes to play a role in stimulating discussion in
Canada and internationally on approaches to democratic
development, both with a view to improve its own instruments and
strategies and to intensify the level of international discussion of
theses issues. To this end, the Centre will convene and participate in
regional and international fora on democratic development,
promoting active participation as well of representatives of
organisations from the South who are at the forefront of debates on
democracy.
Endnotes to Text
- (1) This version of the framework draws liberally on the paper prepared by Gillies (1995). Return to text
- (2) The completed studies are on Kenya, El Salvador, Thailand, Tanzania and Guatemala, and those presently underway are on Peru and Pakistan. Return to text
- (3) The support the Centre provides can take diverse forms according to the issue being addressed, and can involve various sectors of the Centre's personnel and resources. The support can be in the form of a financial grant, co-sponsoring activities particularly designed to increase the legitimacy of certain issues in the public eye), political support (through representations to the national government or to the Canadian mission; through advocacy campaigns on an international level; representations to international institutions), public awareness (raising the media profile nationally and internationally on key issues), financial leveraging (negotiating funding from or co-funding with other international donors).
Return to text
- (4) Aspects of the legal and policy framework which affect and
determine family structure and functioning, and by extension, the
role of women in society, are the following: day care provisions,
pension plans, inheritance law, child support measures, income tax
laws and social programmes in general. Return to text
- (5) By "social practice", we understand not only what takes place
within civil society and the State, but also within social institutions,
and in particular the family, which are not part of either but which
play a key role in mediating the relationship between the individual
and society. Return to text
- (6) Privatisation is in some international circles being
characterised as "economic democratisation". Return to text
- (7) The term "indicators", used in previous versions of the
framework, is here replaced by the term "criteria". These criteria are
the international legal instruments representing the commonly-accepted standard of respect for the whole spectrum of human rights.
In the discussion of each of the criteria chosen, we will set out a
series of indicators which will allow us to measure the degree of
normative and practical respect for these criteria. See grid. Return to text
- (8) Although the category of "democratic institutions" does not
arise directly from the international human rights instruments, we
consider it necessary in order to assess the quality of democracy. Return to text
- (9) As noted by Caceres (1995), the different "generations" of
human rights are mutually dependent, each of them being a
necessary condition for the "real applicability" of the others. Return to text
- (10) That is to say that even where ethnic groups may constitute
a demographic majority, as in Guatemala or Bolivia, they are
politically dominated by the "ideological majority". Return to text
- (11) The major stake-holders are the Centre itself and the
organisations involved as partners in the exercise. These partners will
be principally national organisations in the country under discussion,
but may also include a small number of external funding agencies
committed to supporting initiatives similar to those of the Centre. Return to text
5. Table of Criteria and Indicators of a Democratic Society
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