Human Rights and Democratic Development in Pakistan

by Hina Jilani

Part II

Pakistan: Prospects for Democracy

Growth of Inequality

     Although various political systems have assumed the title of "democracy", over the years some criteria have come to be recognized as intrinsic to any society before it can claim to be democratic. It pre-supposes the existence of a just political and economic system, which not only guarantees freedom but also subscribes to a set of social and political beliefs, attitudes and values which presume the equality of human beings, not only in law but at all levels of social belief and practice.

     Linguistic and cultural diversity, economic disparity, divisions of class and caste, tribal and clan affiliations, and inherited differences of rank and privilege have profoundly conditioned Pakistani society and its responses to democracy and human rights. The most visible characteristic of this society is the dominance of a feudal and tribal social structure, with strong patriarchal and authoritarian trends. Social behaviour is shaped by these trends, which are manifested in a culture of control and monopoly over power and resources.

     The pattern of colonial rule in undivided India had given rise to a ruling elite drawn from feudal and tribal groups and the industrial bourgeoisie. Access to the State for the vast rural majority took place through the patron, who was the feudal landlord or the tribal chief. Power and privilege were negotiated with the colonial rulers by these elites. Patron-client networks had grown stronger during the period of colonial rule.

     The grip of a landed oligarchy in the Punjab and Sindh, and of tribal chiefs in Balochistan and NWFP, over the rural population continued to be a main cause of the growth of inequality in Pakistan. Control of political decision-making remained directly or indirectly in the hands of those who had a stake in maintaining the status quo. Economic policies also accommodated those interests. A series of military regimes co-opted the same stake-holders to perpetuate the tradition of control over power and resources to the exclusion of the 'common man'. A more equitable redistribution of assets never became a part of any political or economic plan, and remained a rhetorical slogan of successive regimes. The social structure, therefore, persists without serious challenges from either state policies or social movements.

      In Sindh, the feudal structure is stronger than in the Punjab, and at the same time the tribal system of NWFP is slightly less hierarchical than the Sardari Nizam (13) of Balochistan. In Sindh and Punjab, particularly in Southern Punjab, power emanates from control over resources, i.e., land and its products. In tribal society, strong ties of clan and kinship impose the necessity to submit to the control of the tribal elite.

     Failure to implement effective land reform has resulted in the continuing prevalence of large land holdings. The first attempt at land reform in Pakistan was in 1959, the second in 1972, and the third in 1977. These attempts failed to bring about any significant reduction in the size of land holdings, and caused no loss of social or political power to the landlords. The major factor responsible for the failure of the land reforms was the ceiling on ownership: the limit to the size of holdings was fixed on an individual, rather than a family, basis. This allowed most of the feudal landlords to circumvent the reforms by effecting fictitious or merely formal transfers of land. Many used other lacunas in the scheme to retain land without declaring any land in excess of the ceiling. The failure of land reforms to achieve the objective of equitable distribution of land is evident in the following observations:

     
• "landlords were left with large land holdings even after declaring land in excess of the fixed ceilings;
  
       
• in 1959, only 35% (1.9 million acres) of the land declared in excess of the ceiling could be taken over by the government. In 1972 this was even less: the total amount of land taken over was 0.1 million acres (14);
  
       
• a major portion of the land taken over by government after the attempts at reform was uncultivated and needed considerable improvement before it could be cultivated. The recipient farmer not having access to credit or support services could, therefore draw neither economic nor social benefit from his new holdings."
  
  

      With the "green revolution" in late 1960s, successive governments saw no need for land reform, as the argument that small farms had a higher yield than large farms could no longer be used to spur action by the government. The prospect for another attempt at more genuine land reform was finally eliminated by a decision of the Federal Shariat Court in 1989 declaring the Land Reforms Ordinance of 1972 to be un-Islamic thereby establishing the principle that the whole concept of land reform is un-Islamic (15).

      While the incomes of the rural elite increased, the rural poor saw only an increase in poverty leading to massive landlessness (16). This not only strengthened feudal fiefdoms, but also swelled the number of people subject to their control. The feudal system operates by controlling all aspects of the subject's life. The landlord sees it as a right to command the labour of the peasant. If any terms are offered, these are extremely exploitative. Often peasants are subjected to forced and bonded labour (17). Social rights of the peasants are also subject to the will of the feudal. Education has been discouraged by the feudal class, which always felt that education would empower the peasantry sufficiently to challenge feudal control. Exploitation has often taken more serious forms of abuse and violence. Rape of women, illegal confinement of families to prevent their mobility, child labour, and cruel and inhuman punishment for defiance of authority are common occurrences under the feudal system in rural Pakistan.

     Women from the peasant class suffer both as members of their social class as well as from denial of rights and status on the basis of gender. While women from the feudal class enjoy freedom from poverty, their status and rights are as vulnerable to feudal practices as those of peasant women. In some respects, the freedom of tribal women and those belonging to feudal families is more restricted than that of peasant women. Deprivation of most of their social rights, including education and health care, results not from poverty but from the strict rules of seclusion imposed on them. No opportunities for economic independence are available. Although entitled to inheritance under the law, patriarchal trends have largely denied this right to women of the landed aristocracy. In order to prevent division of land-holding, only male heirs are allowed a share in landed property. Where title to land is transferred to women, either as a concession to the law, or to avoid land reform schemes, it is only formal and women have no control over the land. More often than not, they are not even aware that they hold this title. Patriarchal attitudes and value systems have denied women autonomy in all decision-making. The right of choice in marriage is totally denied. Women are bartered into marriage to forge family alliances to strengthen the power base, or to protect interests in land-holdings.

     Regardless of class or urban/rural differences, women are subject to cultural practices that are repressive and discriminatory. Many of these practices reflect the status of women in society. They are perceived as having no independent existence or dignity. They are the repositories of family honour, and violation of their honour and dignity is not seen as injury to the women themselves but to the family honour. A common form of humiliation, often meted out to the defiant subject by the landlord, is publicly stripping women of the offender's family. On the other hand, any exercise of freedom of choice in mariage by women, whether in a feudal or tribal setting or in an urban environment, is also seen as blemishing the honour of the family, and results in extreme forms of violence exercised against women.

      Urbanization is rapid and large-scale (18). This has, however, not changed the images of power in Pakistani society. Feudalism in Pakistan is not merely associated with a social system. It has become a way of thinking, and permeates attitudes and values even where feudalism is not practised, as in the urban areas. The `elite in this social milieu as well monopolizes power and resources to the exclusion of the majority. Here, too, people's access to the State is mediated by the elite. The common citizen is dependent on a patron to find employment, to receive protection of life and property from the police, or even to receive medical treatment in public sector health facilities.

Militarization of the State

      Bureaucratic and military institutions rose to a position of dominance very early in the life of Pakistan as an independent state. The nature and extent of military intervention, and the control of the bureaucracy over administrative structures determined the character of the state, and continue to influence the country's political, economic, and social development.

     Why the bureaucracy gained such a dominant role in decision-making was largely determined by the nature of governance adopted by the new state, and the absence of an organized political party at the helm, with stronger support from the provinces. Pakistan had adopted the "vice-regal" form of government, with the Governor General being the depository of pow (19). Lack of organizational machinery in the newly created country with a myriad of problems and meagre resources, had necessitated more and more dependence on bureaucratic structures for administrative control of a very centralized state. Relations between the centre and the provinces were not clearly outlined in the legal framework under which the country was to be governed in the period before a constitution was framed and adopted (20). ). Tensions between the centre and the provinces had arisen soon after Independence, and simmerings of discontent were beginning to emerge (21). At this time the Muslim League took the decision to separate the party from the government. As a consequence, government policies were no longer dictated by popular demand or informed by the advice of the political party. The party organization further suffered in this process. The more popular support it lost, and as confrontation developed with the provinces(22), the central government came to rely more and more on the bureaucracy to impose centralized control. Gradually, the upper echelons of the bureaucracy usurped decision-making power from the political authority (23) and then set about, together with the military, to first derail and then dismantle the political process in the country.

     Initiation of hostilities with India and emergence of the Kashmir issue is a significant factor in giving the military a dominant status, as well as allowing it to engineer an institutional imbalance which has endured to this day. Pakistan's commitment to the Kashmir issue made refurbishing of the army a priority at whatever cost to the exchequer. Regardless of the practicability of a military solution in Kashmir, the dispute became a reason for the military to become the main recipient of the state's financial resources. With India finding an excuse for increasing its defense potential, the military establishment in Pakistan began to press the political leadership for more and more defense expansion, which continues to this day. In order to raise money for this expansion, the military establishment in Pakistan created its own international links, and manipulated these international connections to gain greater role for itself in political and economic decision-making. It finally monopolized that role by intervening directly in 1958, as challenges were beginning to emerge from political groups who were mobilizing the discontentment with the policies of the bureaucracy-military dominated state, just before the national elections to be held under the 1956 Constitution.

      Since then the military has effectively controlled the direction of state policies and determined the course of its politics. Ayub Khan ruled through Martial Law, and then imposed his Constitution in 1962. His period saw the strengthening of the alliance of the bureaucracy and the military and the rise in power of the civil and military bureaucracy. After Ayub Khan, the authority of the civil bureaucracy was seriously impaired first by Yahya Khan (24), and then by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The power of the military remained intact, despite its massive defeat in the 1971 (25) war. Failure of the military operation in East Pakistan (26), and the changing image of the army could have seen a new era of institutional balance in what remained of Pakistan. It was, however, not to be. Challenges to Bhutto's government at the domestic front compelled him to use the military in Balochistan against Baloch nationalists. He could ill afford any disaffection in the military by attempting any massive changes or re-organization in the army. He did try to tame the military establishment by removing some of the military leadership at the top, and thought he had secured himself against any interference in civilian rule by the military by appointing Zia-ul-Haque as the Chief of Army staff, superseding several senior generals.

      Bhutto was proved wrong when Zia seized power through a coup d'etat (27), arrested Bhutto, who was subsequently tried, sentenced to death for murder, and hanged in April 1979. The opposition parties united in an alliance (28) against Bhutto had leveled charges of election fraud against the government, in 1977 and had launched a movement to force Bhutto to step down. Once again the military intervened just as the political crisis was ebbing and talks between the government and the political parties had started. This time the military had disturbed a political order, by removing an elected government, lead by a leader whose personal popularity, though diminished, was by no means lost. It was not a situation similar to 1958, when the military take over had occurred amidst political chaos, economic crisis, and an atmosphere of general discontent with government policies. In 1958 it was not an elected government for whom any portion of the population felt an affinity. There was, therefore, no potential for popular outrage against the move by the military. It was also the first military intervention and the people had not yet experienced the hollowness of the argument that martial law brought stability as opposed to a continuously volatile political environment in which progress was not possible.

     The situation was different in 1977. The people had had a taste of representation, and Bhutto still commanded significant popular support, especially from his home province of Sindh. The prestige of the army had also suffered a blow after the 1971 debacle. It was no more universally perceived as the savior, stepping in to protect the people from exploitation by unscrupulous politicians, which was the message repeatedly conveyed to the public by the military establishment. The military regime, therefore, needed not only a stronger argument for legitimacy of the intervention, but also a conscious decision to use the state apparatus to quell any voice of dissent. This Zia did, ruthlessly and without any compunctions (29).

      While Zia was generally successful in controlling or neutralizing opposing forces for a period of time, it cannot be said that his survival in power for eleven years was the result of a skillful management of internal conditions . External interests and exigencies of regional politics had a significant hand in keeping Zia in power. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had increased Pakistan;s strategic importance in the region. Zia and the western powers, particularly the USA, used this for mutual benefit. While Pakistan's territory was used for training of the Mujahideen (30) to fight the Soviet army in Afghanistan, and as a route for the supply of weapons to the Mujahideen forces, Zia bargained for increased military aid. Agreements to give Pakistan development aid were also readily made. A status quo in Pakistan's power structure was essential for the successful implementation of the agenda of the cold war. Zia's human rights record, or the effects on Pakistan's democratic development were conveniently ignored till the conclusion of the Afghan war. It is significant that it was at this time that moves were made for finding other strategies to give legitimacy to the regime. Internal conditions had become critical and the diversionary tactics were not proving effective any more. Zia began by holding a referendum in 1984. The people were required to answer the question whether they wanted an Islamic government in the country. If the answer was yes, Zia would presume that it is a mandate for him to remain in power for a further five years. This blatant and bare-faced attempt to fool the people was unmatched in the history of Pakistan. It is not surprising that it failed miserably and served only to expose the regime and to reduce its credibility even further. Although non-party elections were held in 1985, and a parliament put in place, martial law was not lifted till 1986, and that, too after constitutional amendments were forced by Zia to create a covert power base for the army, through the office of the President.

     Since 1988 party-based elections have been held. However, the constitutional amendments made to enhance the powers of the President to control the life of the National Assembly allowed the dissolution of four successive Assemblies by the President. Attempts have been made for procuring a constitutional sanction for the military to share political power. While such attempts have not succeeded, other proposals have been made to give the military a greater role in decision-making on critical issue(31). The extent to which the military establishment and the intelligence agencies at its command have played a role in destabilizing civil governments, is a subject of discussion, but can not be properly investigated owing to the shroud of secrecy that surround the working of these agencies (32).

      The responses of the judiciary to interruptions in the political process have not only given legal sanction to military interventions, but have been largely responsible for making a space for the acceptability of these interventions. Superior courts invoked the doctrine of necessity to give legal sanction to military interventions in their judgments (33), with the exception of the coup d'etat lead by General Yahya Khan. However, this judgment (34), though commendable for its rejection of any claims of legitimacy for unconstitutional seizure of power by the military, was delivered long after the usurper had himself been deposed. The effectss of this judgment were short-lived, as the Supreme Court subsequently disregarded the many principles of this judgment, and not only gave legitimacy to Zia's regime, but also gave him the power to amend the Constitution (35).

      While repeated military interventions have stunted the development of democracy in Pakistan, these have affected national integration by sharpening ethnic and provincial disparity in the sharing of power. The army is mainly composed of Punjabis, followed by Pakhtoons. According to one estimate 60-65 percent of army officers and over 70 percent of the high command are Punjabis, and 30-33 percent of the officers are Pakhtun. The Baluch constitute about 2-3 percent , and the Sindhis a mere 1 percent of the army's total strength, with virtually no presence in its higher ranks. The sense of deprivation amongst the ethnic groups not represented in the military become even more acute in periods when the army has come into power. The sustained ability of the military to control and manipulate civil governments, and to dictate state policy, have alienated a large portion of the population from the state. This alienation has been more pronounced amongst the Baluch and the Sindhis. The Punjabi dominated military identifies itself with the nation state, and rejects all claims to ethnic nationalism and sees the arguments for its recognition in the polity as anti-state. Military domination is perceived as domination of the Punjabis, and is deeply resented. The imbalance in the ethnic composition of the military, therefore, has played a role in sustaining and sharpening ethnic divisions in the state.

      In the recent past the military has shown more restraint, and has avoided any direct or overt interference in political affairs (36). It is, however, apparent that the military establishment retains considerable influence in decision-making on matters of foreign policy, especially on Afghanistan and relations with India. Nevertheless, while serious concerns still linger over the relationship between the political authority and the military establishment, tensions are less visible than in the years following the 1988 elections till the last elections in February 1997. The Constitutional amendment taking away the power of the President to dissolve the National Assembly and dismiss the government may have resulted in improving the situation and giving more confidence and security of tenure to the political government.

     While the overt political role of the military has declined, its economic activities have expanded. It owns large industrial, commercial and financial concerns. At the same time the role of the military in civil affairs has increased because of the induction in key civil positions of military personnel both retired and in active service. Every election held after the restoration of civilian rule in 1988 has been conducted with a significant military presence. The armed forces had a major role in conducting the 1998 census. Use of the military for enforcing law and order continues, particularly in Sindh. The Punjab government has resorted to assigning investigations into corrupt practices in sectors such as education and health to the army, and all major road development works have been contracted to the military.

     The burden of defense on the exchequer has not reduced. The weight of defense expenditure is felt more acutely in the current economic crisis. The meager resources for development have shrunk even further under the structural adjustment and debt alleviation plans. The social sector spending has been most adversely affected. Yet no serious consideration to reduce defense expenditure has been given. Although the budget for defense is a part of the finance bill presented for passage by the parliament, the house cannot debate on this portion of the bill. Whenever criticism of spending on defense at the cost of development has surfaced, the government is quick to justify the spending by statements highlighting threat of aggression by India. There are, therefore, indications that while the military may not be playing an active part in politics, its significance has in no way abated, and still retains the power to extract assurances form the political government, at any time that its interests are threatened.

National Ideology vs National Integration

     An underlying common theme for the nation states in the South Asian region is the experience of colonial rule which gave rise to people's movements for independence, thereby also creating the first space for democratic rights. However, the independent governments that followed based their authority on centralized control, which resulted in authoritarianism and the weakening of democracy. Their insistence on homogeneity within the nation-state in the name of national solidarity further eroded democratic rights and restricted the exercise of the promised freedoms. Clearly, most countries in the region have experienced only limited democracy. But democracy also would require a radical change in attitudes and outlook in order for democratic values to take root. Democracy must manifest itself through a strong institutional structure that promotes the political, social and economic development of all sections of the society. To the extent that the system disallows the full participation of any group or category of persons, or denies those freedoms which promote participation, it is not democratic.

      The sub-continent had a long history of social movements (37). Political parties were formed and played a role in negotiating independence. What was, however, missing was a mobilization of citizens joining together as equal members of a "people" or "nation". The extreme diversity of interests within Indian society made such mobilization very difficult. Even the struggle for freedom from colonial rule eventually bifurcated because of the "Muslim interest" which led to the Pakistan movement, initiated in the Hindu-majority areas of India. This "interest" was based on the two-nation theory - a claim that India's geographically dispersed Muslims were a separate and identifiable community entitled to determine its own political future. The emotional bond to this movement amongst the population of the territories that ultimately comprised Pakistan (Muslim-majority areas of India) was, however, only superficial.

     The creation of a separate Pakistani State had a different impact on its subjects depending on their geographical location and political involvement in the Pakistan movement. People inhabiting the border areas of the newly defined boundaries between India and Pakistan witnessed the influx and exodus of population and the accompanying turmoil and destruction and therefore directly experienced the effects of partition and independence. The refugees experienced enormous trauma, and were struggling to cope with a crisis. However, for people who already lived in what became Pakistan there was, by and large, little change. Peasants of Sindh and Balochistan, for instance, were little touched by the emergence of Pakista(38). Participatory demands were not strong because popular mobilization was not sufficiently wide spread. There was no immediate stimulus in the social or political environment to forge bonds of commonality.

     The State itself ultimately proved unable to develop institutions that could accommodate the pluralistic character of the population it had inherited and at the same time create a basis of common interest despite linguistic, ethnic and cultural diversity. Governance based on a centralized state structure was unconducive to national integration. Regional disparities in political and economic power grew. Political leadership drawn from a narrow social base was ill-adapted to grapple with the fundamental dilemmas of national integration. The elite understood the assertion of sub-nationalism as a problem of law and order, and thus used coercion to quell it. This response only intensified the problem. Without opportunities for redress within existing institutions, deprived sectors of the population use ethnic, regional and linguistic identities to mobilize militancy and exert political pressur (39). While this militancy has had other effects on Pakistan's polity, it has triggered no change to the elitist administrative and political system which effectively denies large sections of society any participation in the decisions that affect their economic and social existence.

     Authoritarian regimes and weak democracies have relied on slogans and rhetoric to impose ideologies based on religion, nationalism or a particular economic or political system. Catering to ideologies has often had a negative impact on democratic development, and dissent to the proclaimed ideology is not tolerated. The discourse on rights has also suffered, as the validity of a rights claim is judged on the basis of its conformity to the national ideolog (40). At the same time, conflict with a given ideology is often used as a justification for denial of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms. Freedom of thought, expression and religion, and freedom from discrimination, suffer frequent violation.

     Given this double crisis - a crisis of identity for the population and a crisis of legitimacy for the State - the ruling elite attempted to enforce adherence to an ideology of nationalism and religion. The "ideology of Pakistan" is unclear and ambiguous, yet it has given rise to laws that punish dissidence to this ideology. The belief that Pakistan was founded in the name of Islam and was meant to be an Islamic State is only one level of this ideology. Other interpretations of history and events invite punishment under the law. The "ideology of Pakistan" is used as an instrument of power. Islam as the only legitimate collective identity, the two-nation theory of Muslim nationhood, respect for the Army, have all figured as part of this ideology, and are thus deemed beyond challenge. Intolerance has been promoted in the name of the "ideology of Pakistan". Views that do not conform to the different beliefs of this ideology are dubbed as treacherous and treasonous. Religious minorities are automatically suspect as their allegiance to Islam can never be trusted.

Islam, the State and Society

     As an entity, Pakistan did not emerge from a common vision shared by Muslims from all over India. The people of the new Muslim State had different ideas of why Pakistan existed, and what it meant. Ayesha Jalal has summed up the contradiction in the perception and reality of Pakistan:

"the better remembered slogans of the movement that had brought about its (Pakistan's) creation were shrouded in religious terms. But, contrary to established wisdom about Pakistan, the role of Islam in the processes leading up to the partition of India was to amplify and dignify what remained from first to last a political struggle launched by the Muslim League under the secular leadership of Muhammad Ali Jinnah" (41).

      She argues that the 'two-nation theory' was "essentially a strategy aimed at deriving maximum mileage out of Muslims being a separate political category". To what extent was religion a basis for the demand for Pakistan? Was Muslim identity rather a political category, or was the creation of Pakistan the result of a religious movement for an Islamic State emerging from the religious fervour of the Muslims of India? What role has Islam played in national integration in a country where 90% of the population is of the same religion? These questions are essential for unraveling the relationship of Islam with the Pakistani people and the State. A study of Pakistan's origins, the processes of its social and political evolution, and its present economic, social and political realities leaves no choice but to agree with Jalal's summation in answer to the first question.

"Two major facts substantiate this argument. First, all of the fundamentalist Islamic groups in India, including the Jamaat-i-Islami, had bitterly opposed the creation of a separate State. Jinnah, who had come to be known as Quaid-e-Azam (great leader) by partisans of Pakistan, was dubbed Kafir-e-Azam (the greatest heretic) by these religious groups; Pakistan which means land of the pure (pure in faith), was called Kafiristan (land of the heretics). Their opposition was firmly based on the idea that the separate State of Pakistan was not sufficiently imbued with tenets of religion, and revolved around the political and economic benefits for Indian Muslims. The main objection fielded by Jamaat-i-Islami was the conflict between the two-nation theory and Islamic concepts. Claims by the League that Indian Muslims were a distinct nation and entitled to a separate State were rejected as being contradictory to pan-Islamism. According to pan-Islamism, Muslims of the world were one nation, and Islam did not allow separation or fragmentation of this nation into territorially defined nation-states" (42).

      The second fact is the secular message implicit in the inaugural speech of Jinnah in the Constituent Assembly as Pakistan's Governor General. Jinnah's vision of the future social and political order in Pakistan was indicated in these words :

"You are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan You may belong to any religion or caste or creed - that has nothing to do with the business of the State ... We are starting in the days when there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State ... Now I think you should keep that in front as our ideal, and you will find that in course of time Hindus will cease to be Hindus and Muslims will cease to be Muslims - not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual but in the political sense as citizens of the State".

      This much-quoted portion of Jinnah's speech did provide a secular basis for the relationship of the State to the citizen. Yet, only six months later, he was to strongly advise the Sindh Bar Association to shun provincialism and prepare themselves to "sacrifice and die in order to make Pakistan [a] truly great Islamic State" (43). This is, on the one hand, a classic illustration of the obscurity and ambiguity in which Pakistan's polity was now shrouded, and reflects the infirm basis for legitimacy of the State. On the other, it reflected the insecurities of the leadership which now had to confront vital issues of allocation of power and resources. These issues were a source of tension between the centre and the provinces. Disputes with India and problems of security of life and property were resulting from the disturbances and massive dislocations due to Partition. The emergence of linguistic and ethnic differences spurred by policies of the central government delivered further blows to the chances of national integration. While the Punjabis, who dominated power structures such as the bureaucracy and the army, emphasized "Muslim" identity, the Bengalis, Balochs, Sindhis and Pathans, however, redefined their identity the moment Pakistan was established and demanded more substantial shares for themselves in power and resources. The autocratic power of the central government was identified by them as Punjabi domination. Nationalist sentiments became stronger as a reaction to policies like the adoption of Urdu as the national language. The Bengalis were particularly aggrieved by this as they were in numerical majority and had no affinity to Urdu. Furthermore, Bengali was a major language in India and they felt that the imposition of Urdu was a deliberate attempt to diminish their political significance in Pakistan.

     At this point, Islam offered a moral escape from too many awkward realities. Policies of the central government were accentuating discrepancies between the provinces in terms of political power and economic resources, on the one hand, and narrowing the space for expression of social and cultural rights, particularly for the Bengalis and the Sindhis on the other. Genuine concern for regional interests in national polity was dubbed as negative provincialism by the central government. It lashed out at any resistance to or criticism of its policies as disruptive and in collusion with India. This was only the beginning of the culture of intolerance in Pakistan.

     While the government and State institutions were delivering solemn messages of religious unity, and insisting on Islam as a unifying force, the social elite joined the chorus about Islam's influence in mitigating all social divides. It was attracted to the emphasis in Islam on the right to private property, and its broadly defined concept of social justice. The former they used to protect and increase their wealth, and the latter as rhetoric to divert attention of the deprived from the accumulation of wealth and power for themselves.

     Proclaiming Islam as the ideology of the State served the purpose of giving the appearance of unity to an otherwise disparate people. Above all it allowed the State to establish dominance within a society with highly localized and fragmented structures of authority. It lent legitimacy to a State which had no substantial roots in the society, and which based its authority on a very centralized administrative structure, rather than on the common interest to co-exist.The Muslim League government used Islam as a ploy to divert attention from pressing socio-economic issues. This provided space for a handful of religious ideologues to impose their dominance and enter the power structure riding on the shoulders of Islam.

     Religious groups who had opposed the creation of Pakistan had lost credibility and were now anxious to establish themselves as loyal citizens of the State and to build a base of support amongst the urban lower middle class. The slogan of Islam and Islamic ideology, used by the Muslim League, provided them with a foot-hold and they too exploited it to their advantage by raising the question of an Islamic State. They pointed to the life-style of the ruling elite and attacked the leaders for flouting the teachings of Islam. The attack was partly justified, as the leadership of the Muslim League was secular in outlook and Islamic only in the rhetoric it used for public consumption. The way that the leadership chose to deal with these attacks was to counter-attack the religious groups as being obscurantist and orthodox. It took up the slogan of 'progressive Islam' as opposed to the conformist views of the orthodoxy.

      The more extreme the religious orthodoxy grew in its views, the more the State pandered to this extremism. Discussions were initiated to induct 'Islamic Ideology' into educational content, and to present history in school books from an Islamic point of view. Islam became the reference point from which the State began to define social policy. The ruling clique and the Islamic religious groups (44) now had a common reference point. But their versions of Islam were not the same. Others, including self-styled scholars of Islam, joined this cacophony, presenting Islam as suited their own interests. Massive confusion reigned about what was Islam and how it was to be introduced into the State.

     It would be inaccurate to infer that in the early days after the creation of Pakistan the role of Islam was the central debate related to the construction of the State or that it engaged the attention of all those who were negotiating their position in the State. Provincial autonomy, equitable sharing of political power and allocation of resources remained major issues. They also constituted a cause for mistrust and disaffection towards the State as represented by the central government. In this crisis of consensus, Islam in fact became yet another issue on which there was no agreement.

      In 1949, the Muslim League government introduced the Objectives Resolution (45) in the Constituent Assembly. The Resolution affirmed the sovereignty of Almighty Allah over the entire universe. This sovereignty is to be exercised by the people of Pakistan, through their chosen representatives, but within the limits prescribed by Him as a sacred trust. Fundamental rights of equality and opportunity before law, freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith worship and association would be guaranteed, but 'subject to law and public morality'. Observance of the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice 'as enunciated by Islam', was promised, as were adequate provisions for minorities to freely profess and practise their religion and to safeguard their 'legitimate' interests. At the same time, the State would have the duty to 'enable' the Muslims to 'order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah'.

      The Resolution was broadly worded and thus open to varied interpretations. It was seen by the Hindu members as a significant departure from Jinnah's inaugural speech, and they thus boycotted the session of the Assembly at which it was passed unanimously by the Muslim members. Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister and mover of the Resolution, was himself uncertain about its implications (46). It was used by the religious orthodoxy to its best advantage. In the orthodox view, everything - ranging from social behaviour and practices to government policies - came within the range of what had to conform to 'Islamic principles'. The nature of democracy, freedom, tolerance, equality and social justice under Islam was subject to orthodox interpretation. Failure of the government to adopt policies and measures for remodeling Pakistani society along Islamic lines was criticized as its failure to realize the vision of the Resolution, and this was used to attack government legitimacy.

     The orthodoxy became more and more vociferous in its claim that the social and political norms of statehood lay in Islam. The government could hardly deny this claim after having declared a national consensus (in the shape of the Resolution) on the need to base Pakistani society on Islamic principles. The ruling elite, especially the civil and military bureaucracy, was however not yet disposed to adopt religious extremism or to give legitimacy to the orthodoxy.

     Religious groups did not enjoy popular support for their views on Islam, and had a very narrow political base. Lack of popular support for their views was clearly demonstrated in the 1951 provincial elections, which were based on adult franchise and were the first expression of the people's will after Partition. In the Punjab, one fundamentalist party, the Jamaat-i-Islami, had put up fifty-three candidates, of whom all but one were defeated. The other fundamentalist parties fared no better. Their unpopularity among women is indicated by the conclusion of the Jamaat Majlis-e-Shoora (47), which met in April, 1951 to review the election results. The Shoora noted that the vote exercised by women was more baneful for them than the male votes. They were, therefore, unable to inspire a mass movement for the induction of their demands in the scheme of the constitution under preparation. Views of liberal personalities in influential positions can be gauged from the report of a Commission set up in 1955 to review family laws and to bring them into conformity with social realities. The report was presented in 1956, and appraised the social development of Muslims in the following terms:

"One major cause of this universal backwardness (of Muslims) is the unwillingness of the Muslim peoples to appreciate the significance of the changing realities and the influx of new and undreamt-of factors. The attitude of the employer to the employee, of the landlord to the tenant, of capital to labour and of man to woman, has changed and is changing beyond recognition. These changes require a modern approach, new rules of conduct, and fresh legislation in almost all spheres of life and a radical remodeling of the legal and judicial system. No nation can stand aside as an idle or wondering onlooker while the world progresses rapidly. No nation, big or small, can now stand in indifferent isolation. At the present time, one has either to steer one's boat with skill and firmness towards a definite goal, or as an alternative merely to drift and be engulfed by a rapidly growing stream" (48).

      Problems of ideology, the role of religion in State structures, conflicting ideas of citizenship, equality and representation had created a situation in which consensus was difficult to achieve. The government of the Muslim League began to weaken because of internal friction after the death of the Quaid (49), and a crisis of leadership grew. Combined, these factors delayed the making of the Constitution. Pakistan's first Constitution was enforced on 23 March, 1956, nearly nine years after independence. The Objectives Resolution formed the Preamble to the Constitution. While Islam was not declared as the State religion, it was stipulated that no laws repugnant to the Quran and Sunnah would be enacted, and the existing laws would be brought into conformity with such injunctions. The President was empowered to set up an organization for Islamic research and instruction in advanced studies "to assist in reconstruction of Muslim society on a truly Islamic basis". This was mere lip-service paid to Islam, as no steps for implementation of these provisions were taken during the two years that the Constitution remained in force.

      Enforcement of the Constitution did not resolve the controversies surrounding the structure of the State. One of the more contentious issues was that of joint electorates. This was an issue on which there was religious as well as provincial polarization. The religious parties and the major political forces in West Pakistan supported separate electorates (50). Majority opinion in East Pakistan vehemently supported joint electorates (51). The political leadership of West Pakistan as well as the Islamic parties dubbed anyone supporting joint electorates as a traitor, and accused the Hindu minority in East Pakistan of engineering this support in order to exploit divisions amongst Muslims. They also opposed it as negating the two-nation theory. Hussain Shaheed Suharwardy's (52) comments on this objection illustrate the difference of views on the two-nation theory between the two wings of the country. During a speech in the National Assembly he defended joint electorates, stating:

"The two-nation theory was advanced by the Muslims as a justification for the partition of India and the creation of a State made up of geographically contiguous units where the Muslims were numerically in a majority. Once that State was created the two-nation theory lost its force even for the Muslims ... Today we do not want to develop fissiparous tendencies within the country but create one nation. I, therefore, advocate a joint electorate because this will help ... in destroying the seeds of suspicion, distrust, and hatred between the citizens professing different religions" (53).

      The Constitution was abrogated in 1958 by President Iskander Mirza. Acting in concert with General Mohammed Ayub Khan, he imposed martial law in the country. This further exacerbated the crisis of integration. A confused, incompetent government, grappling for a basis to claim legitimacy, had now given way to a repressive State authority with its own formula for democracy imposed from the top. Since the civil-military bureaucracy traditionally kept the religious parties at bay, before martial law the attitude of the authorities towards the main religious parties remained distant. But now the military government was not able to diminish the significance that religious parties had gained. Two factors were mainly responsible for this.

     First, the military government continued in the style of the previous ruling clique to use "modern" Islam to repress voices of dissent from East Pakistan, Sindh and Balochistan. Ayub Khan explained his Islamic philosophy in a speech in May, 1959:

"When the link between life and religion is snapped, life goes on in one direction or another but religion is reduced to a lifeless object incapable of resilience or progression, and it is confined in the precincts of mosques, and mausoleums. Islam seems to have suffered that fate. While mankind has made great advances in science and philosophy, religion has remained static for centuries...The miracle of Islam was that it destroyed idolatry, and the tragedy of Muslims has been that they rendered religion into the form of an idol."

     This modernistic approach towards Islam may have shown a resistance to religious extremism, but the State still continued to use the Islamic idiom for policy pronouncements. This allowed the Islamic religious groups to retain the foothold they had been conceded by the Muslim League. Ayub Khan's rule was bitterly attacked by the Jamaat-i-Islami as un-Islamic and, with more justification, as undemocratic. Ayub also gave them martyrs by using repressive measures for the persecution of some of the most vocal religious groups. At the same time he co-opted the more pliable religious groups by giving them State patronage to denigrate the opposition of the former groups. Ayub enforced a new Constitution in June 1962. At the time of enforcement, the definition of "State" did not include the word "Islamic" and, though an Advisory Council on Islamic Ideology and an Islamic Research Institute were established by Ayub, these institutions were headed by his co-opted ulema (54) who supported the reforms brought in by him.

     The second factor was the imposition of restrictions on political parties and their activity. The Ayub era was marked by political repression, denial of fundamental freedoms and a tremendous increase in the power of the civil and military bureaucracy. Until a later amendment, the Constitution did not guarantee fundamental rights, but only expressed them as Principles of Policy and Law- Making, which were not justiciable. Political parties were initially banned, and later allowed only limited activity, and the political process remained under strain and was subjected to control. Political forces remained weak and fragmented. Fundamentalist groups, on the other hand, organized themselves under the protection of religious institutions and carried out political and ideological propaganda in this guise. Freedom of speech and assembly was so strictly curtailed that the only expression of political discontent that could be voiced came from the mosques as a part of religious propaganda. These, therefore, became the locus of dissent, and political questions were even more thoroughly mixed with religion during this period.

     The later years of Ayub's rule were marked in West Pakistan by the rise of the Pakistan People's Party, led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. In East Pakistan, discontentment due to economic and political deprivation had turned into bitterness. This took the form of Bengali nationalism and resentment of Punjabi dominance in the State. A movement against Ayub's rule was launched in both wings of the country and, faced with mounting unrest, Ayub stepped down in March 1969, handing over power to the Army Commander, General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan.

     Although the protest movement had received the full support and active participation of the religious parties, it was primarily a movement against political repression. This was clearly demonstrated by the choice people made in the 1970 elections held under martial law. These elections are generally conceded to have been free and fair, and are recognized as such, nationally and internationally. Two political parties emerged: the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) in the West and the Awami League in the East. Both these parties had contested the elections on a platform of political and economic issues. All the religious parties together won only 5.75% of the seats in the National Assembly, the Jamaat securing a mere 1%.

     Bhutto had contested the elections on the slogan of "Islamic Socialism". The PPP manifesto proclaimed that Islam was its faith, socialism its economy and democracy its polity. The ulema had opposed this vigorously; many of them issued fatwas (religious edicts) condemning socialism as kufr (heresy) and ruling that anyone who advocated, supported or voted for it, put himself outside the pale of Islam. Despite all this, Bhutto and his PPP scored an impressive victory in West Pakistan, securing over 56% of the seats. This was the only election in which traditional and fundamentalist programmes for an Islamic state were pitted directly against a proposal for Islamic Socialism put forward by a party that the ulema had almost unanimously condemned as anti-Islamic.

     Despite its absolute majority (51% of the seats in the national Parliament), the Awami League was not allowed to form a government. The Punjabi-dominated military and bureaucratic establishment could not countenance losing its grip on the power it had monopolized for so long. An army operation was launched in East Pakistan against the popular movement. The uncompromising attitude of the West Pakistani army and politicians transmuted this opposition from nationalist to secessionist. Rigidity in the attitude of the Western Wing has been attributed by many political historians to Bhutto's influence and manipulations. His interest definitely lay in gaining power in the wing where he enjoyed a clear majority, rather than in heading a large opposition group in the Parliament. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the military debacle in the ensuing Indo-Pakistani war was followed by the creation of Bangladesh and Bhutto's take-over in the Western wing in December, 1971.

     Politically, Bhutto in power proved much less democratic and liberal than he had sounded during his campaign in the 1970 elections. Although the new Constitution, enforced in 1973, was adopted with the consensus of all the prominent political forces, national cohesion could still not be achieved. A significant provision of this Constitution was the declaration of Islam as the State religion. Neither the 1956 nor the 1962 Constitutions had made this declaration. The majority of the political forces in NWFP and Balochistan were alienated because of Bhutto's centralized approach towards governance. In Sindh, ethnic discontent of the Urdu-speaking population was beginning to emerge as a political force. Bhutto's policies had a distinct bias in favour of the development of rural Sindh and the motivation of ethnic Sindhis to enter the civil bureaucracy. Bhutto was a Sindhi himself, and knew that the rural Sindhi population had always felt alienated from the power structures, having virtually no representation in the military or the bureaucracy. Compared to the Urdu-speaking population of urban Sindh, rural people were much more marginalized. The Urdu-speaking population experienced a decline in privileges under Bhutto, which was perceived as ethnic discrimination. There were rumblings of discontent even in the Punjab, which had thus far been dominant in the power structure.

     A part of the general pattern of authoritarian behaviour - continued under Bhutto - was harassment and humiliation of political opponents and journalists, and extensive use of torture against political prisoners. Economically, the social reforms made little difference to the peasant and the landless farmer, and to their subjugation by the big landlords. Bhutto had begun to use Islamic rhetoric in the face of his failure to effect integration of the different ethnic and provincial interests. He was looking as well for stronger ties with the Arab States as a part of his plans for expanding Pakistan's economy with the help of their oil wealth. At this point some of the Islamic parties began to emphasize egalitarianism and social justice as elements of Islam, while remaining hostile to the 'alien' doctrine of socialism. The basis of Bhutto's popularity being his economic reform and promise of social transformation, the Islamic parties now wished to use the slogans of Islamic social justice, rather than religious dogma, to discredit Bhutto.

     Bhutto showed himself sensitive to pressure from the ulema as early as 1974, when he agreed to declare the Ahmedis a non-Muslim minority and to reword the oath of office for the President and Prime Ministers so as to require explicit belief in the finality of Muhammad's (peace be upon him) prophethood. It is curious why Bhutto felt threatened by the religious groups. The reason could be his distrust of the Army, and the destabilizing effect of religious frenzy, which could be exploited by the military in the face of his declining popularity. Confronted with mass opposition and violence in 1977, he believed he could save his regime by making concessions to the ulema. He announced that Sharia law would be enforced within six months, declared an immediate and total ban on drinking, gambling and nightclubs, and made Friday the weekly holiday in place of Sunday (55). These measures were of no avail. Although the Islamic parties played a prominent part in the agitation that led to his downfall in 1977, there is little evidence to suggest that the growing unpopularity of Bhutto's regime had anything to do with religion as such. On the 5th of July, Zia-ul-Haq, the Army Chief of Staff, assumed power, just as Bhutto was reaching an agreement with other political forces. Another period of martial law thus began.

     Zia-ul-Haq's address to the nation on the day he took power set the tone of his policy. He praised the spirit of Islam that had inspired the opposition movement, and concluded: "It proves that Pakistan, which was created in the name of Islam, will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. That is why I consider the introduction of an Islamic system as an essential prerequisite for the country". Zia used Islamic ideology to legitimate State power in the hands of the military. It was during his eleven years of military rule that the relationship between religion and the militarized State became the major obstacle to democracy in Pakistan.

     In the Pakistan National Alliance movement against Bhutto in April 1977, the fundamentalist parties had been a small but vital component, and the mosques were widely and effectively used by the PNA. Though numerically small, and with no mass support on their own, the fundamentalist groups were able to gain an edge over their allies, both using them and being used in their joint effort to overthrow the government. Obviously, the Bhutto government had felt some need to pacify the religious element, or to gain some measure of support from the Muslim world, as evidenced by the last minute effort to take Islamisation measures. This proved ineffective in saving the regime, but seemed to give weight to the notion that fundamentalism was powerful enough to shake the government, and this was a further step in leading Pakistan down the path of theocracy. The martial law regime which finally overthrew the Bhutto government not only continued the process, but also began to treat Islamisation as its own special preserve. Using religion as its mandate for continuing in power, it allowed the religious parties collaborating with it an influence hitherto inconceivable. The country was increasingly ruled under laws that were the result of the collaboration between a military regime and a conservative fundamentalist element with little popular backing.

     Zia may have lacked popular support, but his policies of militarization and Islamization had a profound effect on State institutions and their responses to democracy and human rights. While militarization undermined an already weak civil society, Islamic fundamentalism diminished the space for tolerance and dialogue. Military courts handed out harsh sentences to journalists, political activists, trade unionists and others who challenged the moral and legal legitimacy of the military government. Militant resistance grew in Sindh and, sporadically, in Balochistan, and was suppressed by military force. At the same time, punishments were imposed under Islamic laws, instilling fear in the population and gagging dissent.

      Women and religious minorities became the main victims of Zia's Islamization. Discrimination was given legal sanction through laws reducing women and the non-Muslim population to second-class citizens (56). Blasphemy laws were used for religious persecution of non-Muslims and the minority sects. Although Zia had to go beyond symbolic measures in imposing Islam, he could not infringe upon the interests of the powerful. His Islamization was, therefore, selective and affected the weaker sections of society. The economic interests of industrialists, feudal landlords, the business and trading communities were not disturbed. Government patronage was generously bestowed upon the religious parties and their institutions. During this period, these groups began to infiltrate not only civil institutions of the State, but also the army. This deeply affected support for democracy and human rights within State institutions. The media was generally used for indoctrination. So also was education policy. The emphasis placed on Islam, as interpreted by the State-sponsored orthodoxy, not only created insecurity for the non-Muslims, it generated sectarian tensions and violence of a degree previously unknown in Pakistan. With religion now a basis for power, different sects and schools of thought began vying for a share of that power. The distinction between modern Islam- previously adopted by the State - and the dogmatic Islam of the religious parties was rooted out. A dogmatic and fundamentalist version of Islam was adopted by the State.

The Popular Response to Islamization

      Although overwhelmingly Muslim, Pakistani society is entrenched in the cultures which preceded the advent of Islam in the sub-continent. While Islam has modified the social patterns of the various regional cultures, none were wholly absorbed by it (57). In the part of the sub-continent which is now Pakistan, the type of Islam that took root challenged the orthodox puritanical school of Islam (58). ). It was influenced by Sufism (59), and retained the attachment to local traditions and symbols, often of Hindu origin, in Punjab, Sindh and Bengal. It is also true that Islam, despite its egalitarian tenets, never obliterated the divisions of class, caste, tribal and clan affiliations in Pakistan. In Balochistan and NWFP, where there was only a minimal Hindu presence, Islam had to acclimatize itself to tribal customs. This diversity of cultures and traditions of the Muslim population in Pakistan is paralleled by profound economic, linguistic, and social differences. These differences, added to the variations in religious practices between urban and rural areas, means that forging feelings of national solidarity on the basis of religion cannot be a sound proposition. It therefore appears that, while the ideological debate has raged within the limited circle of State authorities, the dominant classes, and the religious orthodoxy, the vast majority of the population has not felt this debate to be relevant to its socio-economic needs.

     This is evident from the lack of popular support for the religious parties. From the first general elections in the Punjab after Independence in 1951, through to the most recent national elections in 1997, the orthodox religious parties have never fared well. Their support is limited to a small section of the urban middle class of traders, small businessmen, and some professional and students' groups in the Punjab, and sections of the Urdu-speaking population in Sindh, mainly concentrated in Karachi. In NWFP and Balochistan, where some religious groups have fared slightly better in elections, it has been on the basis of a populist version of Islam, emphasizing its egalitarian creed. That the Pakistani public has twice elected a woman as Prime Minister, despite the clamorous opposition of religious groups to a woman heading an Islamic State, is further evidence of their lack of influence over the electorate.

     Zia struck an alliance with the Punjab-based orthodox and fundamentalist religious parties, mainly the Jamat-e-Islami. During the eleven years of martial law, they received immense patronage from the military government. It was during this period that they entered key institutions. They have used their influence in the structure of State authority to command conformity with their views from a disaffected population. Their organizational abilities have far exceeded their ability to attract support. They have been successful in obtaining vast amounts of funds from external and internal sources either in the name of anti-communism, or as proponents of militant Islamic sectarianism. Their supporters, though limited in number, are very militant and are capable of engineering street agitation and violence, which the administration has always found daunting. Their reaction to their failure to obtain power through democratic processes is to attack democracy as unsuited to Islamic values and precepts of governance. Recently, even the electoral process has been rejected by them and some of the extremist groups, including the Jamaat-i-Islami, boycotted the elections held on 3 February, 1997.

     Rise in the influence of fundamentalist groups in the institutions of State authority, growth of militant sectarian factions, intolerance of dissent from traditionalist and orthodox views on Islam, educational institutions and universities captive in the hands of militant and armed groups of students affiliated to the fundamentalist religious parties, and above all, a body of discriminatory and repressive legislation - all these are part of the legacy Zia bestowed on civilian rule, restored by him in 1986. It was not the support of the Islamic groups that enabled Zia's regime to survive for eleven years. Use of State coercion and unflagging support of the military establishment were the main factors. Zia also co-opted landed and business classes whom he used in the new political arrangements after 1986 to give the regime a civilian face.

     With Zia's death in 1988, the first party-based elections were held in the process of 'restoration' of democracy. The orthodox religious parties received insignificant support in the general elections. They were, however, inducted into the upper house of Parliament, the Senate, through indirect elections on seats reserved for ulema through an amendment to the Constitution made by Zia (60). Other constitutional amendments reduced the power of the representative assemblies, and increased the power of the President, giving him the authority to dissolve the assemblies at his discretion. The main political parties since the 1988 elections have been the Pakistan Muslim League and the Pakistan People's Party. The former was built under Zia's patronage and was initially influenced by both the militaristic and Islamic jargon used by him. The latter was the main victim of Zia's political repression, and drew support on the basis of expectations of socio-economic reforms. Neither was able to effectively deal with the disruptive influence of religious parties on the political process. Both showed a vulnerability to the pressure of radical demands of these groups.

     Civilian rule was restored under arrangements that ensured the primacy of the military in strategic areas of authority. The inherent weaknesses of such a political process allowed for little contribution by the political parties towards stabilizing democracy. On the other hand, corruption and their inability to resolve political tensions and economic crises have resulted in political governments losing credibility. This has given the religious groups grounds for denigrating democracy more vociferously. The political parties are constituted from a narrow social base and dominated by feudals and industrialists. They tend to use religious idiom to conceal their own deficiencies in governance. Though the debate over 'religious ideology' is much less intense, the only response of the political parties to the orthodoxy is to attempt to counter their pressure with arguments for modernistic views of Islam.

     The debate, therefore, seems to have come full circle - but with a significant change. A third dimension to this debate has been added in the form of support for a secular civil order. So far, all arguments on the nature of the State, its institutions, and the status of rights have taken place within the Islamic framework, be it liberal and progressive Islam, or the more rigid and dogmatic version put forward by the extremists. While the secular element has never been totally absent from politics in Pakistan, open discussions on a secular Pakistan were always attacked as treacherous, a threat to the 'ideology of Pakistan' and putting 'Islam in danger'. Early support for secularism sprang from the adherents to socialism. Now the basis for the secular argument is the promotion of human rights and democracy, neither of which, it is argued, can thrive in the milieu of religion. Though by no means a popular position yet, its proponents have grown in number. The position is being adopted by people from different disciplines, and the space for public expression of this position has opened. Expectedly, the strongest attack against this proposition comes from the religious groups, the military establishment and its proponents.

     While the debate rages on, the urgent issues of national integration and governance remain unresolved. The immediate, crucial concerns of the vast majority with respect to poverty, social injustice and economic inequities, remain unattended. The fiftieth anniversary of the country is being celebrated by a despondent population fast losing the hope of State institutions ever responding to basic needs, or administering justice independent of social and political bias. It is in this environment of frustration and despondency that the religious extremists find the ideal opportunity for exploiting issues to their advantage and arousing religious passions among the more vulnerable sections of society, especially the youth.

Notes

13)     The term used for the tribal system in Balochistan. Return

14)     Akmal Hussain, Pakistan: Land Reforms Reconsidered, in Pakistan Society and Politics, Edited by Pandav Nayak, South Asian Studies Series, 1984. Return

15)     Judgment reported at PLD FSC 80. Judgment of the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court confirming the decision of the FSC is reported as 1989 SCMR 2021. Return

16)     Akmal Hussain, Changes in the Agrarian Structure of Pakistan. D. Phil Thesis, Sussex, 1980. Return

17)     See Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, State of Human Rights Reports, 1992 to 1995. Return

18)     1981 census figures show the rural population as 71.7% of the total. The estimated figures for 1996 show this as 67.6% of the population. Economic Survey of Pakistan 1995-96: Government of Pakistan, Finance Division Publication. Return

19)     The office and powers of the Governor General were provided for by the Government of India Act as as adapted by the Indian Independence Act of 1947, which served in place of a constitution till the Constituent Assembly could frame and adopt a new constitution for Pakistan. Return

20)     Ibid. Return

21)     Jinnah's summary dimissal of the Congress government in NWFP is just one example of the non-democratic beginings of the state. Return

22)     By 1950, economic policies had provoked labour trouble in Karachi, Punjab and Bengal and agrarian unrest had flared up in NWFP. Return

23)     A senior bureaucrat Malik Ghulam Muhammad took over the office of Governor General in 1951. He was succeeded upon his retirement by Iskander Mirza, another senior bureaucrat, who became the country's first President under the 1956 Costitution. It was Iskander Mirza who proclaimed the first Martial Law in Pakistan on 7 October, 1958 and abrogated the Constitution. Ironically he became the first casualty of Martial Law when General Muhammad Ayub Khan removed him from office by a successful coup d'etat, and installed himself as the President and the Chief Martial Law Administrator. Return

24)     The General who deposed Ayub Khan in 1969 after another coup d'etat. Return

25)     After the elections in 1970, Awami League, an East Pakistan based party, who had won an over all majority, was not allowed to form a government by Yahya Khan. The leader of the party, Mujibur Rahman was arrested and jailed in West Pakistan. This triggered off massive agitation in the Eastern wing of the country. The Army sought to quell this by military force. India's intervention in the conflict resulted in war between the two countries in in December 1971. The Pakistan Army surrendered to the Indian forces on 17 December, 1971. Ninety thousand were taken as prisoners of war, and were able to return after three years of intense negotiations with India. Return

26)     Now Bangladesh. Return

27)     Zia proclaimed martial law on 5 July 1977. Return

28)     The Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) comprising nine parties from the opposition, including the Jamaat-I-Islami. Return

29)     See pages 22 - 24 for discussion of Zia's period in government, 1977 - 1988. Return

30)     The Afghan freedom fighters. Return

31)     A Council for Defense and National Security was proposed to be set up by the Care Taker Government in January 1997. The Council would be a high level decision-making body which would include in its composition the President, Prime Minister and the Chief of Army Staff. This idea was rejected by the public. The Sharif government did not implement the proposal. Return

32)     Military intelligence services are commonly referred to as the "sensitive agencies". Return

33)     Challenge to the 1958 proclamation of martial law was answered by the supreme court in the case of The State v. Dosso and another, PLD 1958 Supreme Court 533. Return

34)     Miss Asma Jilani v. The Government of the Punjab and another, PLD 1972 Supreme Court 139. Return

35     Begum Nusrat Bhutto v. The Chief of Army Staff and Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1977Supreme Court 657. Return

36)     For instance refusal of the Chief of Army Staff to be persuaded by the President to take any action during a recent crisis between the government and the former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Return

37)     For example the movements for reform of society and religion went as far back as the time of Buddha. Some other pioneers of such movements are Nanak (founder of the Sikh religion), Kabir (poet and reformist), and the sufis. Some examples of the 19th and 20th century movements are those led by Gandhi for social reform, and Sir Syed Ahmed Khan for the modern education of Indian Muslims, the movement of Indian women for suffrage. See Hugh Tinker: South Asia: A Short History. Pall Mall Press, London (1966). Also see Alavi, Hamza and Harris, John, Sociology of Developing Societies: South Asia Monthly Review Press, New York. Chapter by Kathleen Gough, "Peasant Resistance and Revolt in South India" for the peasant movements in Bengal and Hyderabad. Return

38)     Wilcox: Pakistan the Long View, Edited by Lawrence Ziring, Ralph Braibanti and W. Howard Wriggins. Duke University Press, 1977. Return

39)     Mushahid Hussein, Akmal Hussain : Pakistan, Problems of Governance, Vanguard Books Pvt. Ltd., 1993. Return

40)     The plea for change in the Constitution to affect the system of separate electorates, and the rejection of the demand by religious minorities to restore joint electorates are examples. Return

41)     Jalal, Ayesha, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence. Vanguard Books Pvt Ltd., 1991. Return

42)     For a more detailed discussion of the "two-nation theory" and Islam, see article contributed by Asghar Ali Engineer, "Islam and Polity: Contradictions in the Statebuilding of Pakistan" in Pakistan: Society and Politics, Edited by Pandav Nayak. South Asian Publishers Pvt Ltd., New Delhi, India, 1984. Return

43)     On this Jalal comments " One can either conclude that the definition of an 'Islamic State' in the Quaid-e-Azam's personal lexicon was wholly unique or that the travails of office as Pakistan's first Governor-General had weakened his resolve never to take the path of least resistance on matters to do with religion." Jalal, The State of Martial Rule. Return

44)     The Jamaat-i-Islami, Jamiat Ulema-I-Pakistan, Jamiat Ulema-I-Islam, remnants of the Majlis-e-Ahrar. Return

45)     This Resolution served as the preamble for the Constitution eventually adopted in1956 and for successive Constitutions, until it became an operative part of the 1973 Constitution through the Eighth Amendment in 1986. Return

46)     A. Jalal, The State of Martial Rule. Return

47)     The decision-making council. Return

48)     Report of the Commission on Marriage and Family Laws, Gazette of Pakistan, June 1956. Return

49)     Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Return

50)     A system in which the citizens are divided on religious lines. Muslims are defined as the Majority and the others as the non-Muslim minorities. While Muslims are eligible to vote and contest the general elections, the "minorities" can only put up candidates from their own communities for separate seats in the Parliament and can only exercise the right of vote to elect members from their own communities. Return

51)     As opposed to separate electorates, where all citizens have the same right to vote and contest elections regardless of any distinction on the basis of religion. Return

52)     Pakistan's Bengali Prime Minister from East Pakistan, September 1956-October, 1957. Return

53)     Mustafa Chowdhury, Pakistan - Its Politics and Bureaucracy, Associated Publishing House, New Delhi, 1988. Return

54)     Religious scholars Return

55)     Sunday was restored as the weekly holiday instead of Friday by the Sharif government in 1997. Return

56)     These include the Islamic penal laws collectively known as the Hadood laws, which discriminate against women and non-Muslims with respect to the admissibility of their oral testimony, and the age of full criminal responsibility in the case of women.  Return

57)     A. Jalal, The State of Martial Rule, The Orogins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence, Vanguard Books Pvt Ltd, 1991. Return

58)     Alavi, Hamza. Pakistan and Islam: Ethnicity and Ideology, paper published in State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan, edited by Halliday and Alavi, Monthly Review Press, Hong Kong, 1988. Return

59)     A movement started by Islamic mystics, who emphasized peace, brotherhood and tolerance, as opposed to orthodoxy and religious dogmatism. See: Tinker, Hugh. South Asia: A Short History, Pall Mall Press Ltd., London, 1966. Return

60)     Article 59 (d) of the Constitution, added by the Presidential Order No. 14 of 1985, later adopted by the Constitution (Eighth Amendment) Act, 1985. Return