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Human Rights and Democratic Development in Pakistanby Hina JilaniPart IIIIII. Freedom of AssociationThe Constitution of Pakistan recognizes freedom of association as a fundamental right, guaranteed by the State and enforceable through judicial intervention (117). ). This freedom is, however, subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interests of "sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan, public order or morality". Restrictions on these grounds have often been used to curtail freedom of association. Group mobilization in Pakistan has always been weak. While military governments openly restricted group organization and strictly controlled their operation, civilian governments have also used issues of ideology, integrity and security to control group activity and all forms of associational life (118). This pattern of control and regulation began almost immediately after Independence, but was substantially expanded under martial law. Civilian governments acted in a similar way, doing little to promote the freedom of association. Political parties, trade unions, business and professional associations, the press, religious bodies, universities and cultural associations have all been targets of government manipulation from time to time. Freedom of association of certain sectors is limited by law. The Constitution bars those in the service of Pakistan from forming or joining a political party (119). Members of the armed forces, civil servants, television and radio corporations and "essential services" are barred from forming unions. A Supreme Court judgment banned the creation of student unions in universities. This ban is still in force. Legislative control and regulation of associations has been reinforced by a hostile public policy and use of coercion through a variety of security acts and criminal statutes (120). This has seriously impaired the ability of civil society to influence government behaviour, demand accountability or stimulate change. Other factors have also weakened potential mechanisms for structuring participation. Narrow vested interests, political polarization, divisive tendencies of religious movements have prevented the development of a common interest in civil action. The problem goes beyond distrust between government and non-governmental organizations. In an environment of insecurity, suspicion of motives is rife and there is no incentive to associate. Civil society has limited experience of collective action. Few gains have resulted from such action in the past (121). Consequently, tradition of organized group activity at the non-government level did not take strong roots in Pakistan. Trade Unions Pakistan was carved out of an area of the Indian sub-continent with a low pace of industrialization. Post-Partition Pakistan, therefore, had little in the way of an urban working class. There was almost no significant trade union activity. Government labour policy, while giving attention to welfare of labourers, did not facilitate the development of trade unions. Although trade unions were allowed to organize and function, they were not seen as a part of the industrialization process. In fact, government reacted to trade union activity as a potential disruption of the production process (122). Trade unions were allowed as long as they remained apolitical and non-disruptive. With the expansion of industrial activity, the work force began to organize. Pakistan business interests remained aggressively hostile toward trade union activity. Attempts of unions to organize workers were resisted and blocked by various means, including victimization of labour leaders. Government reacted to the growing tendency of workers to organize by issuing laws to prevent strikes and disruption of production. No comprehensive labour legislation was formulated to secure the rights of workers or to define the parameters of the labour-management relationship. Without laws supporting legitimate action by workers and with no legal recognition as a legitimate associational interest, trade unions were unable to develop as an effective force in Pakistan. Pakistan became a member of the International Labor Organization (ILO) in October 1947 and, to date, has ratified more than thirty ILO Conventions. However, proper recognition to trade union activity was given in 1961, by an amendment to the Trade Union Act of 1926. Recognition, however, was a double-edged sword. It required registration and entailed a great deal of government regulation. Unions were exposed to manipulation and harassment by government officials. Government patronage was also used as a means of control. Without an effective legal framework for labour practices, relations between management and labour remained strained and conflict between the two gained intensity. The Industrial Relations Ordinance promulgated in 1969 is perhaps the first comprehensive legislation recognizing the freedom of workers and employers to establish and join associations (123). Collective bargaining and the right to strike were introduced (124). It created labour courts and the National Industrial Relations Commission. The Industrial Relations Ordinance has brought an improvement in the legal status of workers, and has made an effort at reducing exploitation of labour. The law, however, seems more motivated towards maintaining industrial peace than the promotion of the freedom of association. This is also reflected in the performance of the labour judiciary. Labour courts have, by and large, dealt with the relation of labour and management as prescribed by the law and have seldom referred to the larger issue of the freedom of association. Restrictive rules regarding association exist. The State exercises unfair control through registration procedures which can be exercised to adversely affect the lobbying capacity of trade unions. The requirement for registration with government authorities is in itself restrictive and conflicts with the freedom of association. Registration of a union can be cancelled by labour courts on complaint by the registrar (125). Labour courts also have the power to direct the registrar to hold elections in a trade union under his supervision in certain circumstances. The law can be seen as prohibitory legislation as it disallows the organization of unions in certain services and occupations. This prohibition has been upheld by the superior judiciary as a reasonable restriction, having a direct nexus to public order and not contrary to the freedom of association embodied in the Constitution (126). In addition, a recent revision of the definition of "workman", has converted 35% of workers into supervisors, thus denying them the right to join a trade union. While the number of trade unions has increased substantially, and large federations exist both at the national and provincial levels, a coherent trade union movement has failed to emerge. Like other civil society institutions, prolonged periods of restriction of fundamental rights have stunted the growth of trade unionism. It is not that union activity has not taken place. Trade unions have successfully negotiated workers' rights through strikes and collective bargaining. They have been active partners in the sporadic movements for democracy and have managed to survive through periods of extreme political repression. However, their political significance has been limited due to various factors. Pakistan has a predominantly agrarian economy and a large rural population. Organized labour is present only in the formal industrial sector. Trade unions are, therefore, limited to the urban sector and have no relevance to the vast rural population. Increasing informalization of the urban labour force has further reduced the influence of trade unions. It is presently estimated that not more than 15% of the labour force is unionized (127). Exemption of export processing zones and special industrial zones (128) from the application of labour laws and principles of collective bargaining, also contributes to a low percentage of unionized labour. Government policies of interference in union politics, co-optation of leaders, setting up of rival unions to break the strength of more autonomous unions, and use of undue influence in union elections have weakened and factionalized trade unions. Rapid privatization of public sector industries has caused large-scale retrenchment, further weakening the numerical strength of unions. Political and special interest groups have used and misused trade unions to bolster their own actions (129). External influences have been one of the reasons why trade unions were unable to initiate and sustain a strong labour movement. Most action remains limited to a particular sector, and the protesting union becomes vulnerable to repressive action. Trade union action against privatization of public sector industries and services is an example of this limitation. Although it is a question of macro-economic policies affecting workers on the whole, consolidated action is not visible. Unions have organized protests as different industries and services are touched, but have failed to deal with the issue in a comprehensive manner. No uniformly applicable package has been negotiated with the government to secure a just and fair deal for the workers. The policy of marginalizing trade unions is evident from their absence in economic decision-making. Privatization, measures leading to a change in the pattern of labour demand, and recent trade reforms have caused widespread unemployment. Conditions are likely to further deteriorate as a result of the impact of structural adjustment. Yet trade unions were neither involved in the making of these decisions, nor is there any effort to involve them in planning emergency measures to support the affected sectors through the adjustment process. Even where space exists for participation of civil society institutions in representative structures, trade unions have not been included. Five members from each of the provinces are elected to the Senate to represent technocrats and different social sectors. Trade unions have never been represented in the Senate under this provision of the Constitution (130). Trade unions, nevertheless, do retain the potential for effective engagement with the State in their own interest and in the interests of civil society. They have a comparatively high level of awareness and politicization. They are organized and have a great ability to mobilize. This potential for mobilization is their major strength: it is also seen by governments as a major threat. Trade unions need to mobilize beyond protest. Their capacity to use and influence institutions needs to be enhanced. So far, unions have had a role only in improving access to labour courts. They have no organized and planned procedure for regular contact with Parliament. Technical advice and training in situation analysis and devising strategies are weak points that must be developed. This would be an important step towards building their capacity to put forward alternative policies in their areas of concern. Focus on the rights of women workers is feeble. It is true that only a very small portion of the female labour force is unionized. However, trade unions have made no serious effort to attract the female labour force by addressing the myriad problems that this section of the labour force experiences. In some individual cases certain unions have helped women to litigate in the labour courts. However, there have been very few instances where issues collectively pertaining to women workers have been of major concern to unions. Neither have internal policies of unions been conducive to women's participation. Women have no opportunity to exercise leadership in trade unions. This is partly due to the tradition of segregation and social restrictions on women's mobility. Nonetheless, trade unions have rarely raised these issues. Women workers will not have any incentive to join trade unions unless they have the confidence that doing so will improve their condition and strengthen their position in the workforc(131). Political PartiesAt the time of Independence in 1947 (132), the leading political party in Pakistan was the Muslim League, which had been instrumental in starting the movement for partition of India. It also claimed sole representation of Indian Muslims for negotiating the formula of Partition. It therefore monopolized political space in the early years after independence. Parties indigenous to the territories that comprised Pakistan were few and operated in the shadow of the League (133). In the period between 1949 and 1958 several challenges to the League monopoly arose on the political scene (134). Another factor new to Pakistani politics in this period was the appearance of religious groups in politics. While superficially Pakistan seemed to have moved to a multi-party system by the mid-1950s, in reality most parties were rather coalitions of personalities. They had no organized links with major social groups, and group interests were represented through elite incorporation. The parties in government while vigorously suppressing activities of their opponents, themselves demonstrated grave organizational and political weaknesses. Control, coercion and harassment were consistently used for dealing with politicians and political groups. The Public and Representative Office Disqualification Act of 1949 (PRODA) was the first legislative restriction placed on the freedom to engage in politics. This tradition continued with subsequent regimes and governments. It is not surprising that the period was fraught with increasing instability and there was a rapid decline in the average life-span of a government. From 1947 to 1958, Pakistan saw eight cabinets and seven Prime Minister(135). Fragmentation of parties weakened the political process and made space for the military and bureaucracy to intrude into the domain of politics and governance. All political parties were abolished with the military coup of 1958 (136). The Elective Bodies Disqualification Order of 1959 (EBDO) was issued to eliminate and punish political leaders. After the introduction of the 1962 Constitution (137) by the military dictator turned President, Ayub Khan, political parties were allowed to reorganize, subject to government supervision and regulation. Under the system of governance imposed by Ayub Khan, there was little scope for the development of the political process, or for the expansion of the political base of any party. While political parties did exist, politics remained low-key, with no serious challenges to the system (138). The end of the Ayub era saw a spurt of agitational politics, leading to another period of martial law that ended in 1971 with the successful war of independence by East Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh. A positive contribution of this military government was the holding of the 1970 elections, promising not only a return to civilian rule, but also a more equitable sharing of power between the East and West Wings of the country (139). Pakistan lost a valuable opportunity for recreating democratic governance when the Punjabi-dominated western province refused to recognize the right of the majority party from the eastern province to form a government. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, leader of the Awami League, was tried for treason and sentenced to death. The West Pakistan elite, including Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, encouraged and supported military action in East Pakistan thus losing forever any moral basis for claims to democratic ideals. Bhutto formed the Pakistan People's Party prior the 1971 crisis. The party's first experience of electoral politics came in 1970, very soon after its foundation. Many factors contributed to the massive success of this party in the Western Wing. The PPP attracted a wider range of social groups than any party before it with its programme for economic and social change. The party proposed a progressive programme after a long period of oppressive rule, when basic freedoms had been strictly curtailed. At the same time, there was an acute sense of frustration and disillusionment amongst the population, owing to its exclusion from the benefits of a period loudly proclaimed by the rulers, as a "Golden Age" of economic development. People's support for democracy and reform was perceptible in the overwhelming support to the PPP in the early 1970s. It is generally agreed that Bhutto gave the common man a sense of dignity, worth and self-esteem and that this was largely responsible for his popularity amongst the down-trodden and the poorest sections of society. Bhutto in power, however, was no less autocratic than the military dictators who preceeded him. His misuse of the instruments of democracy to perpetuate authoritarianism impaired the cause of democracy in Pakistan (140). The Bhutto government was overthrown by a military coup in 1977, and Pakistan entered its third extended period of government by martial law (141). The regime headed by General Zia-ul-Haque was infinitely more brutal and efficient in imposing control and oppression than any that had come before. Fundamental rights and freedoms were the first victims of this regime. The next eleven years witnessed serious human rights violations at the hands of the military regime or its agents. Human rights were not only violated, but de-recognized and de-legitimized as a deliberate policy. Zia initially justified his deviation from the civilian order as a temporary measure. There was no immediate ban on political activity or political parties and elections were promised to be held in ninety days (142). These ninety days stretched to eleven years. Zia promulgated the Martial Law Order 31 in June 1978, setting up Disqualification Tribunals to inquire into charges of misconduct against those who had contested in the 1977 elections. This was an instrument of coercion and harassment. MLO 31 was applied for mass detention, selective restriction on political activity, and disqualification procedures. All forms of political activity were effectively controlled, and dissent was dealt with by application of harsh punishment under laws specially devised for this purpose. In a deliberate process of depoliticization, political parties and politicians were discreditied, democracy and democratic norms were questioned and portrayed as unsuitable to the Muslim character of the State and to the cultural traditions of Pakistan. This policy was reflected in the establishment of an appointed Majlis-e-Shoora, an advisory council - Zia's substitute for Parliament. The attempt to entrench a non-party system is evident in the 1985 elections, held as a phase of the transition to civilian rule. These elections were held on a non-party basis. All major political parties, including the PPP, boycotted the elections. The survival of political parties, despite the adverse environment, is indicative of their potentially key role in Pakistan. It would, however, be difficult to claim that the political system remained unscathed, or that the prospects for a sustained political process gained strength from the tenacity of political parties. One of the most significant effects of this process has been the reduced capacity of political parties to survive on their own. Even the larger political parties have had to operate as part of alliances both in and out of the electoral context. Their positions and programmes have frequently been compromised as commitment gives way to the imperative of maintaining alliances. The problem is even more acute when such alliances and coalitions form the government. When political parties in power fail to implement the programmes on the basis of which they have been elected, they lose their representative character, thereby undermining the democratic process itself. This tendency has hurt the regional parties even more. In the interest of competing with the larger national parties, they are forced into short-term alliances, either with each other or with a national party whose priorities differ from regional concerns. Often this has been detrimental to the autonomy and independence of regional parties. The positive outcome of such alliances could potentially be the incorporation of regional concerns into national priorities, but this would only be possible should regional parties have the strength to exert some influence over policy. Regional parties are in a position where they have either to submit to these alliances or to assume a confrontational stand, without having the capacity to negotiate their interests from a position of power. Where alliances have been formed within the region, it has resulted in a lack of diversity in programmes and positions. This diminishes options and choices for the potential supporters, and interest in regional politics declines. At the same time their relative isolation limits their participation in national politics. The smaller provinces suffer more in this process. The Punjab has always been the dominant province, with greater influence in the power structures than any of the other provinces. It has been the base for both political parties and power politics. Punjabi interests have, therefore, dictated priorities in political discourse. This dominance has always been resented by the other provinces which are thus denied their due share of power and resources, but also because of the low priority given to their pressing political and economic concerns. Regional parties have reflected this resentment in their relationship to power and to the nationally-based parties. A process of national reconciliation at the initiative of political groups from diverse backgrounds, representing a multiplicity of interests is sorely lacking. Another characteristic of political parties that limits the positive impact of the multi-party system on participatory democracy is the hegemony of specific class and economic interests owing to the composition of the leadership of political parties. The enlargement of the social and economic base of political association witnessed at the end of the 1960s was extremely short-lived. Bhutto's PPP reflected this trend for the first time. Its subsequent alliances with elites drawing power from clan and tribal groupings or the feudal structure did not prove conducive to this expansion. It was, however, Zia's localization of politics that entirely reversed the trend and the basis for political groupings reverted to clan, caste, tribe, class affiliations or religious sect. Again in 1993, the only two national-level parties contesting the elections were the Pakistan People's Party and the Pakistan Muslim League. If the two parties are compared in relation to the composition and the interests represented and the programmes presented, there is little difference between them. Yet the two have undergone very different experiences. The Pakistan People's Party had a popular start and won its first electoral contest with an overwhelming majority in 1970. It became the ruling party, but then it was not only ousted from government, the founder of the party was put to death. For eleven years the party suffered the most extreme kind of repression and victimization. It was constantly engaged in the movement for the restoration of democracy during the long years of martial law. The Pakistan Muslim League (143) is a party with an old name but a totally different orientation from the original Muslim League. The present leadership of the party consists of protégés of the Zia government. They have not emerged from a political process. They have been part of the ruling class for most of their political life. Their experience of being in the opposition has been short and entirely under civilian rule, where they can claim the right to treatment in accordance with democratic norms. Nevertheless, despite this background, PML(N) has legitimized its existence as a political party and has created an electoral base for itself at the national level. What emerges, therefore, from an examination of the present state of political parties is that although there is a multiplicity of parties, it would not be appropriate to say that this constitutes a multi-party system. Pakistan has been evolving towards a two-party system, at least since the 1993 general elections. The other parties are either sectoral or regional and affect the balance of power between the two main parties only at the provincial level, by entering into a coalition with one or the other (144). Public opinion is generally polarized around support for the two main parties. They have dominated the opposition and the government since 1988. In neither capacity has their performance been satisfactory. Yet a third option has not emerged, despite popular dissatisfaction. Perhaps the political process is too young and needs to mature before space can be created for other groups to assert their presence on the political scene. However, prospects for strengthening the two-party system are strong. The political process will benefit from this prospect only if the performance of the two parties improves, and they are able to provide both an accountable government and a responsible opposition. The religious parties have only a restricted electoral constituency and limited popular support. The more recent trends indicate that instead of forming alliances with other political groups, they are forming alliances amongst themselves (145). While some of the religious parties have tried to expand their popular base by raising issues of economic rights, they are still perceived as Islamic religious groups with a fundamentalist orientation, and have not attracted mass public support. They, nevertheless, have gained significant support in the bureaucracy, and in institutions such as the military and the judiciary. Their ability to influence policy through the power structures was built during the Zia regime as a deliberate attempt to maintain the influence of certain lobbies despite a return to civilian rule. In the 1993 elections, religious parties contested individually, and in alliances. The results of this contest reflect their lack of support, especially in the Punjab and Sindh. In NWFP and Balochistan the religious groups have, comparatively, more popular support. Non-Governmental OrganizationsIt is important to examine the contributions and potential of NGOs in the context of the social, political and economic environment in which they function. In the period between the late 1970s and the present, Pakistan has witnessed a mushrooming of organizations with a variety of objectives and for the benefit of different sectors of society. This indicates that there have been few problems for the exercise of the freedom of association during this period. It may, however, be noted that this corresponds to the period (146) during which some associations suffered restrictions on their functioning (147), and experienced different forms of discouragement. It is, therefore, necessary to understand differences in associational interests that determine the response of the State towards them. Most non-political, private, voluntary organizations formed in the early years after Independence were welfare oriented and worked closely with, and often under the patronage of, the government (148). NGOs were traditionally associated with charity and welfare, either for general benefit or for certain ethnic or religious groups. Until the early 1980s there was no history of such organizations performing a role which challenged the existing social or political systems (149). This was a function associated with political parties and was part of their struggle. While many of the NGOs formed in this period were apolitical and continued to perform a welfare function, other groups organized for the attainment of fundamental freedoms and against the oppression of rules of martial law. Many of the rights-oriented NGOs today emerged from these groups. Restrictions on political parties, weaknesses in their organization, and their consequent ineffectiveness, are some of the factors responsible for the creation of such groups. The major factor, however, appears to be the failure of political parties to deal with issues of rights, especially where social or political sensitivities of powerful groups were likely to be strained. For a long time during and after martial law, these groups remained under pressure and were attacked both by government agencies as well as those whose interests and power positions were promoted during martial law and who drew benefit from the existing political and social values and structures. Women's groups are the most notable amongst organizations that emerged during this process (150). The availability of abundant development funds during this period also acted as an incentive for the formation of development organizations. This was a period during which Pakistan's strategic position gave it global importance because of the conflict in Afghanistan. Large amounts were made available by international agencies and foreign donors for both relief work connected with the Afghan war and development work within Pakistan. At the same time, the government of Zia-ul-Haq was also expounding its commitment to welfare. Funds were allotted for development of infrastructure to be disbursed through favourites of the government who encouraged the growth of NGOs to absorb the special funds. It is, however, true that genuine and effective development organizations also emerged in this period and, together with some which already existed, made valuable contributions to development (151). The approach towards development varies: some organizations focus their work on the development of services, training of service providers, improvement of infrastructure (especially in the fields of education and health) and generally believe that provision of adequate services is a priority in development needs. There are others who, while acknowledging these needs, believe that development strategies need to integrate social and political development without which sustainable human development is not possible. It is the latter category that is defined as "rights-oriented" (152). It is also this difference in approach that has determined their relationship to the State and government. Despite tense relations with governments in the past and lack of any facility from the State machinery, some of these organizations have been able to make remarkable contributions in creating a better environment for rights. While some NGOs function with financial support from government, most receive grants from multilateral agencies and foreign donors (153). It is true that many NGOs did function without any grants-in-aid initially. However, these organizations achieved considerable improvement in their performance and systems with the resources made available through financial grants. Some criticism has recently emerged with respect to the accountability of NGOs receiving foreign funding. During the last PPP government, a bill sponsored by Federal Minister for Social Welfare and Special Education was prepared. This bill provided for a degree of control over NGOs that could curtail their independence. Most of the major NGOs objected to the provisions of the bill. These organizations accepted the principle of accountability and transparency. However, they were not willing to concede the government powers of interference in the functioning of NGOs. These objections were countered by the Minister and his supporters by criticizing the work of NGOs, and making general and vague allegations of financial mismanagement and misuse of funds against them. A small section of the press also joined in this criticism. Regardless of whether the criticism was justified or not, the performance of NGOs receiving such aid has been appreciable and their contributions have been acknowledged by government and critics. NGOs are beginning to strengthen themselves through national and international networks whom they draw upon for support and improvement of skills. Pakistani NGOs are beginning to emerge from isolation and are becoming more active on the international scene. This has been a great help in increasing their effectiveness in advocacy and is lending more maturity to the conceptual framework of their activity. There are no formal restrictions on the creation of NGOs. Registration laws do exist (154) and most of the NGOs are registered under one law or another. However, there is no restriction on the operation of NGOs which prefer not to be registered. A major reason for registration is a requirement by donors. Regulations are by and large innocuous, and do not place restrictions that are offensive or unreasonable. The cumbersome procedures for registration do become a problem to some. NGOs do function effectively without registration and no apparent difficulties or facilities depend on registration. Relations between government and NGOs are likely to be adversely affected by the proposal of the last PPP government to legislate a new registration law for NGOs, if the same proposal is supported by the present government. The bill is still awaiting approval of the Cabinet. The most serious objection to the draft bill is the restriction on the operations of NGOs that do not register. The bill also contains provisions that would undermine the independence and autonomy of NGOs. The government is likely to gain a measure of control over the NGOs in financial and procedural matters that could be used, if the government so chose, for forcing NGOs into conformity or discouraging criticism of government policies. While representatives of the government have denied the allegation, it is generally perceived that the government is beginning to see the strength of NGOs and public support for them as a threat. On the one hand there is a realization that NGOs are crucial for development, on the other there is a desire to control activity and the impact of this activity. How far NGOs will be able to defend their autonomy without making compromises on critical issues depends largely on their capacity to organize and mobilize in solidarity. Many NGOs are active in fields where government cooperation is indispensable for their work. These are the ones most vulnerable to government pressure and the ones most likely to dissociate themselves from any collective NGO action resisting government policy NOTES117) Article 17 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan: "Freedom of Association.- 118) It is interesting to note that amendments were made in the original Article 17 by the elected government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, restricting the freedom of association and allowing more government control over political parties. Return 119) Article 17 (2) of the Constitution. Return 120) Official Secrets Act, Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance. Return 121) For example the mobilization against oppression or misrule by different governments was based on the expectation that it would bring about more democratic governance. People's disappointment and disillusionment in this respect, in the opinion of the author, is one of the factors that has made mass mobilization on these issues progressively difficult. Return 122) Kochnak, Interest Groups and Development. Return 123) Section 3 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Return 124) Sections 22 and 32 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Return 125) Section 10 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Return 126) Malik Aman, etc., vs Federation of Pakistan, 1993 SCMR 1837. Return 127) Human Rights Commission of Pakistan: State of Human Rights in Pakistan, 1993, page 34. Return 128) The proposal for setting up 12 special trading zones in the four provinces is still pending full implementation. Return 129) Political parties, for example the PPP, have solicited support of trade unions for political mobilization, but when in power have made no contribution towards strengthening the unions. Return 130) Article 59(1)(d) of the Constitution. Return 131) Some groups have recently organized for rights of women workers, but their activity is still marginal and links with mainstream trade unions, though claimed, are neither strong nor clear. Return 132) Pakistan gained independence from British rule simultaneously with the partition of India in August 1947. Return 133) The movement for Pakistan was initiated and took roots in areas where the Muslims were in a minority. The areas comprising Pakistan were those where the Muslims were in majority. Political groups active in these areas, e.g. the Unionists in the Punjab, are referred to here as the indigenous parties. Return 134) Notable amongst whom were the Republican Party, the Awami League and the United Front, an alliance of regional parties from the east wing of the country, based on Bengali regional and ethnic demands. Return 135) It took Pakistan nine years to formulate and enforce the first Constitution in 1956. Civil rule prevailed in Pakistan for eleven years after Independence. However, the delay in constituting the State weakened the political process, resulting in power struggles. This severely undermined the progress of democracy. Return 136) Pakistan has experienced three military coup-d'état, in 1958, in 1969 and in 1977. Return 137) The 1962 Constitution was promulgated by the military dictator General Muhammad Ayub Khan. Article 173 of the 1962 Constitution prohibited any person from contesting elections as a member of a political party unless permitted by act of Central Legislature. Provision for political parties was made later on in the Political Parties Act of 1962. Return 138) The only voices of dissent during this period that have left a lasting mark came from politicians and parties primarily based in East Pakistan, the Jamaat-i-Islami (a fundamentalist religious party, having influence mainly in urban Punjab) and political parties having their spheres of influence in the smaller provinces (e.g. the National Awami Party, based in the NWFP). Different forms of punishment were used against these parties. Maulana Abul A'ala Maudoodi, the leader of Jama'at-e-Islami was tried for treason and narrowly escaped a sentence of death. Return 139) In the 1970 elections Pakistan People's Party won an overwhelming majority in the western wing and the Awami scored an even better success in the eastern wing. East Pakistan, being larger in terms of population, had more seats in the national Parliament. The Awami League was, therefore, the majority party entitled to form the government. Return 140) Bhutto used the Parliament for enacting legislation seriously restricting democratic rights and fundamental freedoms. Declaration of the Ahmedis as a non-Muslim minority, and an amendment of the Constitution to restrict the independence of the judiciary were actions taken by the Parliament at Bhutto's bidding. Return 141) The imposition of martial law was preceded by large-scale demonstrations against Bhutto for rigging the election in 1977. Return 142) A large portion of the Constitution was placed in abeyance, including fundamental rights and Article 17 on the freedom of association. However, The Political Parties Act, 1962, remained in force. Return 143) The Pakistan Muslim League has many factions. The faction headed by the present Prime Minister is known as the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz Group), with the acronym PML (N). Return 144) Since the writing of this report, elections were held in February, 1997. The PML(N) was elected with massive support. The PPP now is a weak opposition, having drastically failed to gain any significant electoral successes in any of the provinces except Sindh. The regional parties have a stronger role in the Federal Parliament now than they have ever had before. Return 145) The Jamaat-i-Islami, for instance, opted out of the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad with the PML and other parties, under whose banner it participated in the 1990 elections. The Jamaat boycotted the 1997 elections after its dismal performance in the 1993 general elections. Some of the other religious groups have formed non-electoral alliances, such as the Islami Yakjehti Council. Return 146) For the purpose of this section on NGOs, the period under study is the late 1970s to the present. This period was chosen because most of the organizations interviewed were formed during this period. Return 147) For instance, political parties and trade unions. Return 148) The All Pakistan Women's Association (APWA), one of the largest and oldest national NGOs, was perhaps the first welfare organization. It functioned under government patronage. Wives of district administrative officers have always been the patrons of district branches. Return 149) The role of religious organizations and their relation to religious political groups is discussed later in the report. Return 150) The Women's Action Forum and the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan are examples in this category. Return 151) The Agha Khan Rural Support Programme can be cited as an example Return 152) The approach of NGOs is used as the basis for defining the difference between the two kinds of NGOs referred to in this section. It is not meant as a measure of their performance. Return 153) NGOs are the only forms of association which are under no formal restriction on receiving foreign funds. Return 154) Voluntary Social Welfare Agencies Registration and Control Ordinance, 1961; Societies Registration Act, 1860; Cooperative Societies Act. 1925; Companies Ordinance,1984 and The Trust Act, 1882. Return CONTENTS NEXT PART |