Protecting Human Rights in a Global Economy
Challenges for the World Trade Organization
By Robert Howse and Makau Mutua 2000
The Authors
Robert Howse is Professor at the University of Michigan Law School and a member of the faculty
of the World Trade Institute, Bern, Switzerland. He has taught world trade law at the University of
Toronto and Harvard Law School, and in the Academy of European Law, European University
Institute, Florence. Among other works, he is the co-author of The Regulation of International Trade
(second edition, 1999), author of Economic Union, Social Justice and Constitutional Reform (1991)
and editor, The World Trading System: Critical Perspectives on the World Economy, vols.1-4
(1998).
Makau Mutua is Professor of Law and Director of
the Human Rights Center at the State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law. He holds a
doctorate in law from Harvard Law School. He has taught law at Harvard Law School, SUNY Buffalo,
the University of Puerto Rico School of Law and the University of Dar-es-salaam, Tanzania. He is the
Chair of the Nairobi-based Kenya Human Rights Commission. He was Co-Chair of the 2000 Annual
Meeting of the American Society of International Law. He sits on the boards of several international
organizations and academic journals. He has written extensively on human rights and has
consulted widely for the United Nations and NGOs.
Preface
Over the past decade, trade agreements have come
under increased scrutiny from the public. More and
more people -- peasants, trade unionists, human
rights activists, small businesses, environmentalists,
farmers, students and others -- are expressing
concern about how trade agreements are affecting
their lives. For all the talk of the benefits of
globalization and its presumed contribution to
economic growth, the undeniable reality is that
globally, and within most countries, the gap between
the rich and the poor is widening, and hundreds of
millions of people are denied the basic human rights
provided for by the United Nations. The creation of
the World Trade Organization (WTO), outside the
auspices of the UN, has aggravated many of civil
society's concerns.
There is no consensus on how trade liberalization
affects human rights, nor even a well-developed
methodology for determining the human rights
impacts of trade agreements. Many people in the
mainstream trade policy community see no linkage
whatsoever with human rights and consider such
concerns outside their realm. Likewise, many human
rights groups lack familiarity with trade issues. They
are puzzled by the language and suspicious of the
entire process: from the negotiations of tariffs to the
settlement of disputes. The two communities are so
far apart that they do not even use the same
vocabulary, let alone share a common philosophy.
Both trade and human rights have been codified in
highly developed legal regimes, negotiated by
governments since the end of World War II. These
two legal regimes have developed however in splendid isolation from
one another. Both trade law and human rights law
narrow the range of policy options that are available
to governments. And yet, it seems that the question
of whether the two legal regimes are contradictory
has rarely been asked.
It is in this context that Rights & Democracy decided
to commission a paper by two experts in these two
fields of law. We were delighted that Robert Howse
and Makau Mutua accepted our invitation to work
through some of the challenges posed by human
rights instruments to trade law. This paper details a
number of instances where the WTO, as it exists
today, does have the ability to take human rights into
account. While the institutional architecture of the
WTO is far from what human rights activists would
like it to be, we expect that this paper will lay to rest
the argument that the WTO has neither the mandate
nor the capacity to consider human rights in making
its decisions.
This paper is a product of dialogue--dialogue
between the two authors with their respective fields
of expertise, and dialogue among 26 participants at
a workshop Rights & Democracy hosted in Seattle.
While the paper has been enriched by these different
perspectives, there is certainly no agreement on the
best strategy for ensuring that human rights do
indeed have practical, and not just theoretical,
influence over trade rules. There are notably major
differences over consumer-driven action, the role of
sanctions, the proposal to expand the mandate of the
WTO, and how best to protect labour rights.
So what is to be done? Some would argue that there
is no point in attempting to reform the WTO, that its
structure is so flawed it should be scrapped
completely. Others would support the institutional
reforms suggested in this paper, perhaps assisting
the WTO in developing procedures for international
agencies, experts and NGOs to intervene in dispute
settlement procedures. Civil society organizations are
likely to pursue many different avenues in attempting
to resolve these critical issues. We at Rights &
Democracy hope that this paper will provide
assistance and some legal arguments for those trying
to convince governments and multilateral institutions
that trade and human rights cannot be carved off into
separate departments, and that their primary legal
obligations lie in the references to human rights in the
UN Charter.
Warren Allmand, President -- Rights & Democracy
Executive summary
Since the 1980's, we have experienced the
acceleration of globalization, a process driven
primarily by the rapid integration of the world's
economy. Globalization has led to new challenges
and opportunities for the protection and promotion of
human rights. Although the current trade and human
rights regimes are both post-war phenomena, they
have developed on parallel, separate and sometimes
inconsistent tracks.
As the postwar GATT regime evolved into the World
Trade Organization in late 1994, so its rules and
those of its accompanying agreements evolved into
a detailed legal code, which is interpreted and
defined through a dispute settlement process. This
process, however, has not been transparent and has
not viewed dispute resolution through the lens of
human rights impacts. Provisions of WTO
Agreements on domestic food safety and other
technical standards, as well as on intellectual property
directly affect the ability of governments to fulfill their
human rights obligations to their citizens. This is
especially true in the case of social and economic
rights, which should be understood in connection
with, not in isolation from, civil and political rights.
This paper argues that trade and human rights
regimes need not be in conflict, so long as the trade
regime is interpreted and applied in a manner
consistent with the human rights obligations of states.
This interpretation respects the hierarchy of norms in
international law, where human rights, to the extent
that they have the status of custom in international
law, and certainly where they have the status of
preemptory norms, will normally prevail over specific,
conflicting provisions of any treaties including trade
agreements. The preamble of the WTO Agreement,
which establishes the framework for the entire WTO
system, does not make free trade an end in itself.
Rather, it establishes the objectives of the system as
related to the fulfillment of basic human values,
including the improvement of living standards for all
people and sustainable development. As is widely
recognized now, both in development literature as
well as in numerous documents of international
policy, these objectives cannot be reached without
respect for human rights.
The UN Charter states that one of its "purposes" is to
"achieve international cooperation in solving
international problems of an economic, social,
cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting
and encouraging respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all"
Although the GATT text -- now part of the broader
WTO system of treaties-- reflects the recognition of
non-trade public values, which are meant to prevail in
the event of conflict with its free trade rules,
institutional isolation has contributed to a very limited
interpretation of this principle. Specifically, GATT
Article XX, which was designed to be a fundamental
pillar of the international trade regime, has often been
construed so restrictively as to almost read it out of
text, or to marginalize it. Compounding the problems
created by institutional isolation is the atmosphere of
secrecy and the lack of transparency in the dispute
settlement and appellate process within the WTO.
The GATT has often been interpreted as creating a
general right to free trade; however, as emphasized
in a few recent decisions of the WTO Appellate Body,
the GATT and the other WTO treaties contain fine
balances of rights and obligations. And the provisions
that limit or balance trade liberalization, protecting
other human interests, are as fundamental a part of
the international law of trade, as those that support
the globalization of markets. They must not be read
out or down.
Enlightened interpretation of the GATT and other
WTO agreements, however, will not in and of itself
address the needs of under-development, inequality
and the corresponding violations of fundamental
human rights around the world. Trade rules must be
looked at in their relationship to other phenomena
connected to globalization, such as free capital
movements and the practices of the international
financial institutions. We must understand the effects
of trade laws and policies in the broadest sense, and
evolve new laws and policies in a manner that
overcomes the isolation between human rights
institutions and economic institutions, including those
preoccupied with the trading system.
Highlights
- The relationship of trade law and human rights law: In the event of a conflict between a universally
recognized human right and a commitment ensuing
from international treaty law such as a trade
agreement, the latter must be interpreted to be
consistent with the former. When properly
interpreted and applied, the trade regime recognizes
that human rights are fundamental and prior to free
trade itself.
- Labour: It is often claimed that the GATT prohibits
members from regulating access of imports based
on the manner in which those products have been
produced, even if such regulations are applied
equally to domestic products. However, this view is
inconsistent with a close analysis of the
jurisprudence, despite its presence in two notorious
panel rulings, which were not adopted as legally
binding by the GATT membership. The correct
reading of the GATT text would permit a country to
impose conditions on imports related to the labour
practices involved in their production.
- Government Procurement: The current negotiation
of government procurement rules with respect to
services provides the opportunity to develop the
position that human rights-based procurement
conditions are consistent with WTO law. As well, the
existing Government Procurement Agreement,
which concerns trade in goods, should be
interpreted so as to permit ethical purchasing
policies by governments. Not permitting members of
the WTO to impose the kind of requirements on
foreign suppliers that they routinely impose on
domestic suppliers (such as anti-discrimination
requirements) would amount to an obligation to
favour foreign suppliers, which the GPA could not
possibly be read as to entrench. Further, the public
order exception in the GPA must be interpreted in
light of the international law of human rights.
- Trade Policy Review: WTO member states are
currently subject to a review process which
examines their policies and practices in relation to
their promotion of free trade. This is inconsistent
with the actual full objective of the review process,
which is to review policies in their relation to the
"functioning of the multilateral trading system". The
objective of the trading system is not free trade as
such, but rather "ensuring full employment", "optimal
use of the world's resources" and "sustainable
development". National trade policy and practice
should be examined in relation to the achievement
of these goals.
- Dispute Settlement: Consideration of the human
rights impact of dispute settlement rulings would be
facilitated by the acceptance of amicus briefs by
panel and appellate body members. In the
Shrimp/Turtle case, a precedent has been
established for the submission of amicus briefs to
both the panels and the Appellate Body. Secrecy of
pleadings and oral argument in WTO dispute
settlement, however, may limit the effectiveness of
amicus participation, and these provisions of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding should be
revisited as soon as possible.
- Global Governance: Interpretation of WTO law has
not incorporated the expertise of other institutions
governing the various regimes of international law.
Nor has there been serious dialogue or interaction
between the WTO as an institution and other
relevant international institutions. However, the
agreement establishing the WTO requires that this
be the case. The implementation of this obligation
should be the subject of a formal review.
Introduction
Since the late 1980s, the ascendency of market
economics coupled with a revolution in information
technology has accelerated the process of
globalization while institutions of international
governance have been unable or unwilling to catch
up. Privatization and the related phenomena of
deregulation, structural adjustment and a myriad of
new bilateral, regional and multilateral trade and
investment agreements have proceeded without
credible efforts to conceptually and practically
address their impacts on legally protected human
rights. This paper addresses the tensions and
potential synergies between the two legal regimes
governing trade and investment and human rights.
Trade and investment agreements, as well as the
practices of international business, must be held
accountable to existing human rights law. The spirit
of human rights law must frame the development of
trade law if either is to achieve its goals.
The ability of capital to move across borders with
increasing ease in the era of globalization has
implications for human rights. While human rights
violations existed long before this period of rapid
economic integration, the growing number of sectors
covered by multilateral trade and investment
agreements has set the stage for a new variety of
human rights abuses which have not yet been
suitably addressed. Consider the example of Nigeria
where in the last decade foreign oil companies and
military governments have laid waste to vast tracts of
land in the oil-producing areas and responded with
chilling brutality when the Ogoni people sought to
protect their fundamental rights. In several Asian
countries and other emerging markets, businesses
and governments have supported practices which
violate the rights of workers with impunity through
sweatshops and child, slave, unfree, and bonded
labour. At the same time, globalization has served to
focus heightened attention on such practices in
general, including abuses that existed before
globalization but were often ignored.
Global "free" trade and universal human rights
regimes are both post-war phenomena. However,
they have developed on parallel, separate, and
sometimes inconsistent tracks. 1 The contemporary
international economic order, which is based on the
push for a single global market, has its basis in the
Bretton Woods System. 2 The origins of the global
trading system were laid with the International Trade
Organization (ITO), which was to be an integral part
of the blueprint for global peace and security after
WWII. 3 A fair international trading regime was
thought to be essential to global peace.
Beggar-thy-neighbour economic competition among
the western countries--with escalating retaliatory
tariffs and quotas--was seen as a cause of instability
in Europe. Such policies were blamed for the rise of
fascism, and ultimately, the outbreak of WWII.
Significantly, the Bretton Woods architects were
worried about more than beggar-thy-neighbour
competition from overt trade barriers. The ITO was
designed to address restrictive business practices
and fair labour practices.
Several factors, however, changed this vision and
resulted in a different multilateral trading order. First,
the ITO proposal failed. In its place, a minimal set of
rules, concerned mostly with border measures and
explicit domestic discriminatory policies against
imports, was adopted. The General Agreement on
Tarriffs and Trade (GATT) had virtually no
institutional framework, and nothing, for example,
about concerns such as fair labour practices.
Secondly, with the bifurcation of the world by the Cold
War, the GATT essentially became an entity for the
liberalization of trade among western countries.
Without a doubt, it achieved considerable success in
the reduction or elimination of a range of trade
barriers among these countries. Freer trade became
an engine of growth for the project for economic,
social and political reconstruction in Europe and
Japan. The alliance of governments and private
initiative were instrumental in the recovery efforts.
Once developing countries began to join the GATT in
significant numbers, they soon felt their needs were
not addressed adequately by the post-war regime.
Many were caught up in the East-West conflict.
However, some minimal amendments to the original
GATT agreements allowed developing countries
certain exemptions or reduced obligations to
liberalize trade. Ironically, developing countries were
able to erect very high barriers to many of the most
important exports of other developing countries, even
as tariffs on products traded among the developed
countries fell. The GATT, which was concerned
exclusively with the negotiation and monitoring of
rules for freer trade, operated in splendid isolation
from the other international institutions of the
post-war order. Many in GATT expressed pride and
satisfaction that the multilateral trading order had
made progress towards rules-based free trade while
other international institutions remained paralyzed or
anemic because of geopolitics.
By the 1970s, the GATT had become successful as
a forum for tariff reductions. As a result, increased
attention came to be paid to a wide range of
domestic policies. While not obviously discriminatory,
some of those policies could amount to cheating on
or undermining of negotiated concessions. Thus,
issues such as subsidies, dumping, and "technical
barriers" to trade became increasing preoccupations
of the GATT system. With the creation in 1994 of the
World Trade Organization (WTO), many of the areas
of normative controversy such as technical barriers,
services, intellectual property and subsidies were
addressed by explicit new rules. 4
Unlike the skeletal legal framework of the original
GATT text, the new WTO agreements set rules which
are not merely general "standards" that an expert
bureaucracy can use in crafting dispute-specific
solutions. They often have the character of detailed
legal code, embodying trade-offs between regulatory
autonomy and trade liberalization explicitly negotiated
ex ante. Moreover, the failure to abide by these new
rules--and indeed the old rules as well--as
interpreted in dispute settlement triggers a right to
retaliation against the offending party, with the level
of retaliation subject to determination by arbitration.
Under the old GATT, rulings of dispute panels
required adoption by the membership of the
organization, whereas under the WTO system, the
rulings are subject to appeal to a standing Appellate
Body, but are effective, as upheld or modified on
appeal, unless a consensus of the membership is
opposed to adoption.
The WTO, the United Nations and the international
financial and economic institutions, have created an
institutional base for development of a "global
consensus" for lawful and universally agreed-upon
behaviour in the political, economic, trade, social and
human rights arenas. Celebrating an existing "global
consensus", however, is premature as the
relationship between these bodies remains
undefined. For example, what is to be done when
there is a clear conflict between, say, a particular
human right and a principle or provision in
international trade law? Should human rights "trump"
trade law or vice-versa? Will international law develop
a body of rules that advances "free" trade while at the
same time promoting and protecting human rights?
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights has written that trade liberalization, "must be
understood as a means, not an end. The end which
trade liberalization should serve is the objective of
human well-being to which the international human
rights instruments give legal expression". 5
The challenge before the world today is how to
influence the process of globalization in such a way
that human suffering, poverty, exploitation, exclusion,
and discrimination are eliminated. Since trade is the
driving engine of globalization, it is imperative that, at
the very least, rules governing it do not violate human
rights but rather promote and protect them. The effort
to fashion such rules would benefit from a process
which is inclusive, transparent, democratic and
participatory across all barriers. In such a process,
international financial and trade institutions, and the
WTO in particular, would engage civil society as well
as governments, inter-governmental organizations
and businesses in this reformulation. In recent years,
the World Bank itself has placed some emphasis on
the role of civil society and popular participation as a
part of its governance program. 6
This paper discusses the difficult nexus between
trade and human rights and identifies areas of
tension and possible reconciliation. It argues that
trade and human rights regimes need not be in
conflict, so long as the trade regime is applied and
evolved in a manner that respects the hierarchy of
norms in international law. Human rights, to the
extent they are obligations erga omnes, or have the
status of custom, or of general principles, will
normally prevail over specific, conflicting provisions
of treaties such as trade agreements. The WTO laws
and processes must be interpreted in a way that
advances human rights, transparency, accountability
and representivity. It concludes that human rights and
trade are fundamentally linked and must be seen as
complementary, not oppositional.
Human Rights in International Law
In the last fifty years, the body of international human
rights law has achieved a moral plateau rarely
associated with any other area of international law. In
fact, the power and righteousness of human rights is
so great that virtually every modern cause has sought
to cloak itself in the language of human rights. 7 Louis
Henkin, a leading academic, has described ours as
the "age of rights" 8 and human rights as the "only
political-moral idea that has received universal
acceptance." 9 Philip Alston, another prominent
scholar, has argued that the "characterization of a
specific goal as a human right elevates it above the
rank and file of competing societal goals, gives it a
degree of immunity from challenge, and generally
endows it with an aura of timelessness, absoluteness
and universal validity." 10 Founded on the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which Henry
Steiner has described as the "spiritual parent" 11 of
other human rights treaties, human rights law is now
an indispensable part of the international landscape.
There is today an impressive catalogue of universal
and regional human rights treaties and institutions.
Whether their mandate is simply to monitor,
encourage compliance with, or enforce human rights,
this maze of norms and institutions has sharply
contracted the traditional international legal concept
of state sovereignty, which once granted states
impunity with respect to internal misconduct. Human
rights do not, of course, negate the sovereignty of
states, although they constrain it in important ways.
International law does not replace national law;
rather, international law instructs sovereign states on
internationally accepted human rights and, for the
most part, leaves it to states to implement those
norms domestically.
Human rights law has modified international law in
fundamental ways. Since WWII, it has become an
uncontested principle of international law that a
state's treatment of its own citizens is not solely a
matter of domestic jurisdiction. 12 It is true, of course,
that human rights is not the only doctrine of
international law that constrains the power of the
state. In recent decades, the forces of globalization
and the unparalleled predominance of global
capitalism in the political and economic choices of
states have further undermined the authority of the
sovereign state. But ideas and values implicit in
human rights have added an entirely new dimension
to our understanding of the concept of state
sovereignty.
Whereas previously, the state, or the monarch
representing it, was the absolute sovereign, human
rights norms now vest sovereignty in the people. This
concept of sovereignty, which is expressed in the
Universal Declaration, 13 the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 14 is termed popular
sovereignty. The concept grew out of the liberal
tradition, 15 humanitarian law, 16 international labour
standards 17 and regimes for the protection of
minorities. 18 Such sovereignty derives from the
people, not the state. Although powerful states have
sometimes used this principle to justify the use of
force against less powerful states often resulting in
new forms of human rights abuse, the fact that
human rights law has controlled and curtailed the
reach of sovereignty, the most fundamental construct
in international law, is a testament to its centrality in
international relations.
Human Rights as Customary International Law
Constitutionally, human rights are based on the
United Nations Charter. UN treaty instruments and
bodies that address human rights issues are created
pursuant to the UN Charter. The Charter specifically
charges the UN to promote the entire gamut of
human rights. It asks the UN to promote "higher
standards of living, full employment, and conditions of
economic and social progress and development" 19
and "universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." 20 To
underline the seriousness with which it took human
rights, the UN asked the Economic and Social
Council to "set up commissions," 21 including those
"for the promotion of human rights." 22 The Charter
further requires member states to "take joint and
separate action" 23 in cooperation with the UN to
promote human rights.
The UN Charter does not resolve the question of
hierarchy of law, or, put differently, whether human
rights law has primacy over other domains of
international law. However, the Preamble reaffirms
"faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men
and women and of nations large and small." 24 The
promotion and protection of human rights is thus one
of the "ends" or purposes for the establishment of the
United Nations. The Charter states that one of the
"purposes" of the UN is to "achieve international
cooperation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character,
and in promoting and encouraging respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." 25
Although the term "human rights" appears in
scattered places in the UN Charter, and is terse and
even cryptic, there can be no argument that it is
mentioned in vital contexts, a fact that underlines the
centrality of human rights to the UN system. 26
In international law, the status of a rule is determined
by its source as law. There are four recognized
sources of international law: international conventions
or agreements; custom; general principles of law
common to the major legal systems of the world; and
the judicial decisions and teachings of distinguished
writers. 27 Of these, the most relevant for our
discussion are the first two, namely, treaty law and
customary international law. The status of human
rights in international law, therefore, is determined by
its location within the sources of international law. All
human rights norms do not have the same status in
international law. While some may be located in
customary international law, most are codified in
human rights treaties.
Unlike treaty law, which is based on the consent of
states, customary international law binds all states.
Customary international law "results from a general
and consistent practice of states followed by them out
of a sense of legal obligation." 28 Thus customary
international law binds all states without exception
and irrespective of their consent. In contrast,
international treaty law only binds those states which
have given their express consent to the treaty or
agreement in question. For human rights, this
distinction is critical because the location of a human
rights norm in either source changes its status in
international law and could constitute the difference
between an automatically binding obligation and a
voluntary commitment. Customary international law,
unlike treaty law, must be obeyed by states, their
wishes notwithstanding.
The scope and content of the customary international
law of human rights, as indeed of all customary law,
is a work in progress. While there are certain human
rights whose status as custom is generally agreed
upon, that list is not necessarily complete or closed.
But it is clear from existent international law that a
"state violates international law if, as a matter of state
policy, it practices, encourages or condones" 29 the
following conduct: genocide; slavery or slave trade;
the murder or causing the disappearance of
individuals; torture or other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged
arbitrary detention; systematic racial discrimination
such as apartheid; and consistent patterns of gross
violations of internationally recognized human
rights. 30 The last category, that of "consistent
violations of internationally recognized human rights,"
has a very broad scope and includes the human
rights protected in all the major universal human
rights treaties. 31 Such violations infringe customary
international law if there is a "consistent pattern of
gross violations" as a matter of state policy. 32
Two vitally important concepts in understanding the
status of human rights in international law are those
of jus cogens and obligations erga omnes. Rules of
jus cogens, or preemptory norms of general
international law, describe international obligations
from which derogation is not permitted under any
circumstances, even in cases of emergency. These
have been defined by the 1969 Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties as norms "accepted and
recognized by the international community of states
as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is
permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having
the same character." 33 Rules of jus cogens trump all
other rules of international law, and are therefore in
the first rank in the hierarchy of the law of nations.
The Vienna Convention anticipates the emergence of
new rules of jus cogens in the future, a point that
underscores the fact that jus cogens is an evolving
concept, and that the substance and nature of its
rules change with the progress and development of
international law and morality. 34 Although there is no
list, as such, of rules that constitute jus cogens,
prohibitions against the slave trade or slavery,
genocide, piracy and violations of human rights are
regarded as preemptory norms of international law or
jus cogens. Additionally, these practices give rise to
obligations erga omnes, that is, they give all states an
interest in their prohibition. This point was
emphasized by the International Court of Justice in
the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company,
Ltd. In that case, the court's opinion read, in part:
[A]n essential distinction should be made between
the obligations of a State towards the international
community as a whole, and those arising vis-a-vis
another state in the field of diplomatic protection. By
their very nature the former concern all States. In
view of the importance of the rights involved, all
States can be held to have a legal interest in their
protection; they are obligations erga omnes. Such
obligations derive, for example, in contemporary
international law, from the outlawing of acts of
aggression, and of genocide, as also from the
principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the
human person, including protection from slavery and
racial discrimination. Some of the corresponding
rights have entered into the body of general
international law...; others are conferred by
international instruments of a universal or
quasi-universal character. 35
Views from distinguished international law institutions
and scholars give much of international human rights
a customary legal character, and some of it the status
of jus cogens. 36 The position that human rights are
obligations erga omnes is increasingly gaining
ground. In particular, the International Law Institute
has taken one of the most vigorous positions on this
issue. It wrote the following in 1989:
This international obligation [to respect human
rights]...is erga omnes; it is incumbent on every State
in relation to the international community as a whole,
and every State has a legal interest in the protection
of human rights. This obligation further implies a duty
of solidarity among all States to ensure as rapidly as
possible the effective protection of human rights
throughout the world. 37
International law is increasingly treating fundamental
basic human rights as a part of customary
international law. First, the UDHR itself, that
"common standard of achievement for all peoples
and all nations," 38 is now deemed to possess a
normative, obligatory character that gives at least
portions of it the status of customary international
law. 39 Although not a treaty, and therefore not
binding, the UDHR is so widely accepted and revered
by governments that they invoke it, refer to it, and
use it as a guide for fashioning constitutional and
other laws as well as for formulating both domestic
and foreign policy. Its acceptance by states has been
so total and universal that it may now be said to meet
the standard of opinio juris sive necessitatis, a
practice that states follow out of a sense of legal
obligation. Mary Ann Glendon has written that the
UDHR "is already showing signs of having achieved
the status of holy writ." 40
A large portion of the body of human rights law has
acquired this obligatory character in international law.
The universal acceptance in principle of human rights
by states of all political stripes and their invocation at
the domestic and international levels, coupled with
the active involvement of virtually all states,
individually and collectively, to promote and protect
human rights through the United Nations and regional
human rights systems in Africa, the Americas and
Europe, has led to a certain belief that states have
assumed human rights obligations beyond the mere
acceptance of treaty law.
GATT Article XX and WTO Dispute Settlement
Specific conflicts and tensions between trade law and
human rights law regimes cannot be understood
without looking at the relationship between the WTO
and other international legal regimes. Institutionally,
the GATT developed in isolation, a fact which
produced a single-minded free trade perspective. But
the actual text of the GATT reflects the recognition of
supervening non-trade public values which were
meant to prevail in the event of conflict with the free
trade rules in the GATT. GATT Article XX provides
that nothing in the GATT "shall be construed to
prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
contracting party of measures" inter alia, "necessary
to protect public morals," "necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health," "relating to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production and
consumption," "essential to the acquisition of or
distribution of products in general or local short
supply" and "relating to the products of prison
labour." 41
It is important to note that international human rights
was in its infancy when the provisions of GATT
Article XX were negotiated. But the GATT drafters
certainly included a very broad range of human
interests recognized widely at the time as being
fundamental or related to very basic human values.
Unfortunately, the institutional isolation of the GATT
has had a negative impact on the interpretation of
Article XX in dispute settlement in the Thai
Cigarette 42 and Tuna Dolphin 43 cases, certainly the
most important opinions prior to the creation of the
WTO. The panels in those cases construed Article
XX so restrictively as to almost read it out of the
GATT, or to marginalize it. Alarmingly, the notion
developed that measures might only be justified
under Article XX if no less trade restrictive alternative
could be imagined to achieve the policy objectives in
question. Since neo-classical economists can almost
always find some policy instrument other than trade
restriction that could hypothetically, and without
regard to real world costs, achieve a given policy
objective, this interpretation amounted to making
Article XX largely superfluous. In the original design,
however, Article XX was designed to be a
fundamental building block of the international trade
regime.
The creation of the WTO gives the world a new
opportunity to put Article XX in its rightful place in the
GATT. Doing so must involve the re-interpretation of
Article XX in light of the norms of international human
rights law. Contrary to the GATT tradition of isolation
and self-containment, it is now a well-established fact
in the WTO that its rules and institutions function in
the context of the evolving broader framework of
international law. Thus the construction of WTO
jurisprudence by its dispute settlement organs must
not contradict rules of interpretation set forth in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 44 This
must include "any rules of international law" relevant
to the dispute. 45
The clearest illustration of this approach to WTO
legal interpretation is found in the Turtles 46 case. In
that case, the Appellate Body of the WTO examined
the meaning of the expression "exhaustible natural
resources" in an environmental trade dispute. The
Appellate Body adopted an interpretation that
included endangered species within the meaning of
the expression, which is found in a provision of the
GATT that allows members to take trade action
otherwise not consistent with GATT obligations
where the measures are taken in relation to the
conservation of such resources. The Appellate Body
referred to international environmental law as it had
evolved since the negotiation of the original GATT
text. It concluded that international environmental law
had to be used as an appropriate benchmark for the
meaning of exhaustible natural resources.
The Preamble of the WTO Agreement states a
number of objectives of the WTO system that may
relate to certain human rights obligations, especially
labour rights and elements of social and economic
rights. Article XX (a) of the original GATT allows
members to take otherwise GATT-inconsistent
measures necessary for the protection of "public
morals". It can be argued that where trade restrictions
may be a necessary mechanism for dealing with
gross human rights abuses, there is a possibility of
invoking the public morals exception. However, this
provision has never been interpreted in dispute
settlement. It is an open question how strictly such
measures would have to be justified, given the use of
the term "necessary" in the provision. Moreover,
concerns persist that such restrictions could be
subject to abuse for protectionist purposes.
In the past, the GATT traditionally gave the term
"necessary" in other provisions of Article XX a very
restrictive reading. However, because of the new
approach under the WTO Appellate Body, the
meaning of the necessity test would have to be
considered in light of relevant rules of international
law, including international agreements on human
rights. It would also take into account whether that
situation was considered as pressing under
international human rights law or recognized as such
by international human rights institutions. Article
XX(b) of the GATT also allows for trade measures
that would otherwise be GATT-inconsistent where
necessary for the protection of, among other things,
human life or health.
The Preamble of the WTO Agreement and Human Rights in WTO Law
The Appellate Body of the WTO has emphasized on
several occasions that Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states the
basic rules of treaty interpretation, is a fundamental
reference point for WTO dispute settlement. It
provides that a treaty "shall be interpreted in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in
the light of its object and purpose." An important
"context" for treaty interpretation here is the text of
the treaty itself, "including its preamble and
annexes." 47 The preamble is therefore an important
source of "context" in the interpretation of any
provision of a treaty text. It is as important as any
other provision of the treaty for the purposes of
resolving a dispute. The preamble to the Agreement
of the WTO, however, has a special status. The
Marrakesh Agreement is the framework agreement
for the entire WTO system, and the preamble is the
most comprehensive statement of the objectives or
goals of that system. Thus it is probative not only with
respect to context, but also purpose and object within
the meaning of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.
This explains the heavy reliance by the Appellate
Body on the preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement
in the Turtles case. In that case, the United States
sought to justify trade measures on environmental
grounds, in particular the need to protect sea turtles,
which it characterized as an endangered species.
The Appellate Body held that Article XX of the GATT
had to be read in light of the preamble to the
Marrakesh Agreement, and especially the
commitment to sustainable development as an
objective of the multilateral trading system. The
phrase "exhaustible natural resources" in Article XX
(g) of the GATT, the body said, must be interpreted
in light of evolving norms and rules of international
environmental law.
Significantly, however, the preamble does not
explicitly mention human rights, although it talks
about raising "standards of living" and the need for
"sustainable development." These values must be
read as supervening free trade for its own sake.
Nobel laureate economist and philosopher Amartya
Sen has recently argued the following:
Development requires the removal of major sources
of unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor
economic opportunities as well as systematic social
deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as
intolerance or overactivity of repressive states.
Despite unprecedented increases in overall opulence,
the contemporary world denies elementary freedoms
to vast numbers--perhaps the majority--of people. .
. Freedoms are not only the primary ends of
development, they are also among its principal
means. In addition to acknowledging, foundationally,
the evaluative importance of freedom, we also have
to understand the remarkable empirical connection
that links freedoms of different kinds with one
another. Political freedoms (in the form of free
speech and elections) help to promote economic
security. Social opportunities (in the form of
education and health facilities) facilitate economic
participation. Economic facilities (in the form of
opportunities for participation in trade and
production) can help generate personal abundance
as well as public resources for social facilities.
Freedoms of different kinds can strengthen one
another. 48
Human Rights and the GATT
WTO members undertake a standard set of
obligations whose purpose is non-discriminatory
treatment of products in each other's markets. To the
extent that deviations are permitted from this general
script, there are clear provisions governing
permissible measures. In addition to the
Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment 49 and the National
Treatment 50 clauses, states are prohibited from
imposing restrictions, other than those permitted
under GATT, 51 on imports or exports. The text of the
GATT does not, however, explicitly list human rights
as grounds for the exclusion of products. It does,
however, contain provisions that permit states to
protect and promote human rights through trade by
taking certain measures against states that violate
human rights. The pivotal provision in this respect is
Article XX which provides a wide array of exceptions
under which a WTO member can promote and
protect human rights without being in violation of
GATT. 52 The exceptions that would not constitute
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised
restriction on international trade include measures to
protect public morals, measures necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health and measures
relating to the products of prison labour. 53
Article 103 of the UN Charter is also pivotal to the
interpretation of the international obligations of
member states. It provides that in "the event of a
conflict between the obligations of the Members of
the United Nations under the present Charter and
their obligations under any other international
agreement, their obligations under the present
Charter shall prevail." It is clear here that a
treaty--even one of universal application--would be
overridden by the UN Charter in the event of a
conflict. The subject matter of the treaty is irrelevant.
Thus, for instance, in Aerial Incident Over
Lockerbie, 54 the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
ruled that member states are required under Article
25 of the UN Charter to carry out UN Security Council
resolutions over other international treaty obligations.
In that case, the ICJ held that the Security Council
could require Libya to turn over bombing suspects,
even though the Montreal Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation permitted Libya to choose domestic
prosecution over extradition.
The significance of Article 103 lies in the construction
of the phrase "the obligations of Members of the
United Nations under the present Charter." As noted
earlier, the references to human rights in the UN
Charter are sparse and erratic, though important.
Broadly read, those references place obligations on
member states to promote and protect human rights.
But they do not spell out those rights, preferring to
leave their elaboration to the UDHR and to specific
human rights treaties. Thus it would appear that in
the event of a conflict between a human rights
obligation, particularly one that is universally
recognized, and a commitment ensuing from
international treaty law, the former prevails or the
latter must be interpreted to be consistent with the
former. The GATT and other WTO agreements are
treaties which would be subject to such obligations
and interpretations. Human rights norms should
always be taken into account when interpreting
international trade and investment obligations.
Exclusion and Transparency within the WTO
The negotiation of trade and investment agreement
takes place within a culture of secrecy and exclusion.
Non-governmental organizations and official
inter-governmental organizations concerned with
human rights have traditionally been excluded from
these processes. Two recent examples underline the
absence of "outsider" participation. First, the Uruguay
Round of negotiations, which yielded the 1994 GATT
and the other WTO agreements, was closed to all but
the few industrialized, mostly Northern, states that
control the global economy. The process was closed
to most of the Third World, where three quarters of
the global population lives. Second, the negotiations
on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)
were carried out by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) in an
atmosphere of high-level secrecy.
Opacity and exclusion define many of the processes
of the various WTO bodies. What is particularly
disturbing is that UN expert human rights bodies,
such as the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights, which has been
concerned with the intersection of trade and human
rights, have not been included in the GATT/WTO
processes. There is textual basis for involving NGOs
and intergovernmental organizations in WTO
deliberations. Article XXIII(2) of GATT allows the
WTO to permit intergovernmental organizations into
its processes. 55 Likewise, Article V(2) of the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization makes allowance for the consultation of
NGOs. 56 It is the deep-seated culture of secrecy, not
the lack of textual authority, that has kept "outsider"
groups from participation in WTO structures. Many of
these organizations would provide much needed
information and insight into the complex problems
globalization raises. 57
The manner in which WTO provisions are interpreted
is of fundamental importance to human rights. Most
domestic legal systems, and an increasing number of
supranational adjudicative bodies, allow public
scrutiny of judicial proceedings. Regrettably, written
and oral pleadings in the WTO remain secret unless
states party to the dispute consent to openness. This
secrecy keeps NGOs, including those dealing with
human rights issues, from participating in the dispute
settlement process. Such secrecy is notably
inconsistent with the norms of transparency required
by the WTO itself in domestic legal trade-related
proceedings.
It is an encouraging sign, however, that the Appellate
Body in the Turtles case recently interpreted WTO
law as permitting the submission of amicus or
intervener briefs in WTO cases. Although there is no
explicit provision to that effect, such briefs are now
permitted at both the panel and appellate levels of
dispute settlement. The WTO legal affairs and
Appellate Body secretariats must therefore develop
working procedures for the submission of briefs in a
timely and effective manner. Pressure will be
necessary because neither of these bodies appear
eager to make outside interventions a routine
practice.
Several issues must be addressed in order to open
up the WTO process. A filing system that informs
interveners that their briefs will be seen in a timely
fashion by panels and the Appellate Body must be
instituted. The imbalance of resources must not be
allowed to affect the quality and effectiveness of
intervener advocacy on behalf of developing
countries at the WTO. Consistent with the expansion
of legal assistance to governments of developing
countries, NGOs from those states must have access
to legal assistance for the preparation of their own
amicus briefs. Organizations with human rights
mandates, such as the ILO, the UN Commission on
Human Rights and the World Health Organization
must become aware of and gain the competency
necessary to take advantage of amicus intervention
in WTO proceedings with human rights implications.
Amicus submissions, like all pleadings, must be
accessible and part of the public record. The entire
record, including the briefs, should be posted on the
WTO website. Finally, the panels and the Appellate
Body should be required to evaluate amicus briefs for
consideration. The usual practice in domestic and
international tribunals is to consider such briefs on
the basis of leave, or discretion, of the tribunal. But a
WTO panel has a legal duty to make an objective
assessment of the facts. This should be understood
to mean that the evaluation of briefs for consideration
must be based on objective criteria. Such evaluation
must consider the relevance of the brief to the
dispute and must not be biased or one-sided.
Labour Rights
There has been strong resistance to placing
responsibility for the protection of workers' rights
within the WTO framework. Developing countries
have been one source of such resistance.
Developing countries are legitimately concerned that
low labour standards could be used by developed
countries as a pretext for disguised protectionist
measures against them. It is important to note that
some developing countries have used this argument
to perpetuate and condone slave labour and
exploitative forms of child labour. In effect, such
manipulative discourse misuses trade language to
justify non-compliance with human rights standards.
The International Labour Organization has
promulgated 177 conventions on labour standards.
These conventions and other related documents
address a broad range of basic rights, from the
freedom of association to detailed standards in
particular industries. The ILO has, however, been
subject to criticism. The breadth and diversity of its
activities have been blamed for its lack of focus on
the essential human rights of workers in the new
global economy. Second, the ILO lacks formal,
effective mechanisms for dispute settlement and
enforcement. Its tripartite structure of
decision-making only involves national delegates
drawn from business, trade unions, and government.
While this makes the ILO more open than other
multilateral organizations, it often excludes NGOs
and transnational civil society interests.
The reality of today's global economy raises concerns
around the representivity of the workers' interests by
national trade unions as well as the representivity of
business views by national business associations.
The representivity of workers' issues is particularly
complex as governments in some countries sanction
selected trade unions and suppress others.In a
Declaration adopted by its membership, the ILO
recently articulated a set of core labour rights. It listed
these rights as the "freedom of association and
recognition of the right to collective bargaining," the
"elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory
labour," the "effective abolition of child labour," and
the "elimination of discrimination in respect of
employment and occupation." 58
It has been argued that low labour standards are a
necessary strategy for the economic development of
poor countries. In a comprehensive study, however,
the OECD found that respect for basic labour
standards similar to those in the ILO Declaration
supports rather than undermines open trade-oriented
growth policies in developing countries. 59 The report
noted that "the clearest and most reliable finding [of
the study] is in favour of a mutually supportive
relationship between successfully sustained trade
reforms and improvements in association and
bargaining rights." 60 It is true that the definition and
interpretation of the right to association is a complex,
contextual exercise. This does not mean, however,
that such rights are too vague and indeterminate to
be effectively enforced internationally. Notice should
be taken that many of the key obligations in the WTO
agreements were drafted in very general terms, but
dispute settlement involving the non-discrimination
provisions in Articles I and III of GATT has resulted in
highly contextual interpretative exercises.
Ministers of WTO member countries decided in the
1996 Singapore Declaration to "renew [their]
commitment to the observance of internationally
recognized core labour standards". 61 That
Declaration stated that the ILO "is the competent
body to set and deal with these standards." 62 The
Declaration rejected the use of labour standards for
"protectionist purposes." 63 However, this did not
resolve what the WTO should do if a developed state
contemplates trade measures, not for protectionist
purposes, but as a response to the non-compliance
by a developing state with fundamental human rights
in labour.
The United States and the European Union have
provisions in their domestic laws that allow the
withdrawal or modification of preferential trade
arrangements with developing countries on many
different grounds. These preferences are granted
voluntarily and not by virtue of a binding legal
obligation under the WTO. It therefore would be
WTO-consistent for these countries to condition such
preferences on labour rights performance. A serious
issue arises, however, when a WTO member seeks
to condition the WTO-required market access on
labour rights practices in a particular exporting
country.
The GATT itself does not create a general right of
free access for imports. A member's basic obligation,
subject to additional rules in the codes on food safety
and on technical barriers, is to provide treatment as
favourable to imports as that provided to domestic
products. It seems fair to assume that a country that
has banned slave labour in domestic production, for
instance, could equally ban imports of products from
facilities that use slave labour. This would amount to equal treatment of both domestic and imported
products, with reference to the requirement that slave
labour not be used. Requiring a country to accept
imported products produced with slave labour,
regardless of the treatment of like domestic products
in its law, would in fact amount to demanding more
favourable treatment to imports. GATT law does not
mandate such a requirement and it is hard to imagine
that many countries would agree to it.
In the Tuna/Dolphin cases, which dealt with trade and
the environment, two unadopted GATT dispute
settlement rulings suggested that equal treatment
within the meaning of the National Treatment
obligation of the GATT related only to measures
based on the physical characteristics of a product.
Therefore, irrespective of whether domestic products
are treated similarly, there would be a per se violation
of the GATT provision on import restrictions and
prohibitions in the case of measures that
distinguished products in their manner of production.
This ruling has very questionable legal foundations in
the GATT text. Furthermore, it is also inconsistent
with previous rulings adopted by the WTO
membership. In particular, it departs from a case in
which the National Treatment concept was applied to
a scheme in which the products were distinguished
based on whether their production entailed the
violation of intellectual property rights. 64
It is also appropriate for the WTO dispute settlement
organs to determine whether trade measures taken
for the protection of public morals or of human life or
health are necessary when taken against imports
from countries that violate labour rights. It is arguably
a violation of the Most Favoured Nation obligation in
GATT Article 1 to single out products on the basis of
the policies of the government of the country where
they are produced. Article 1 requires that imported
products be "unconditionally" extended the same
rights under the GATT, regardless of the country they
come from. However, Article XX allows the
justification of otherwise GATT-inconsistent
measures, where these measures are defensible on
certain public policy rationales, including the
protection of public morals and the protection of
human life and health. 65
Fundamental labour rights, recognized by the WTO
membership in the 1996 Singapore Declaration, enter
into the definition of public morals. Some, like the
prohibition against enslavement, are human rights
with the status of jus cogens. Human life and safety
are clearly implicated in cases of slave labour and
particularly extreme forms of child labour.
Nevertheless, trade sanctions cannot provide a
comprehensive solution to the complex issues that
affect the labour rights performance of WTO
members. Sanctions should be viewed only as a final
strategy when others have been exhausted.
Incentives in the form of preferences to developing
countries which enforce basic labour rights would be
a more effective means of encouraging progressive
realization of labour rights. WTO members should
provide technical assistance where needed and
adequate time to implement corrective measures
should be given to those countries which have
demonstrated a commitment towards the rights of
their workers. The WTO should disfavour punitive
sanctions that isolate a particular political regime
rather than address particularabusive governmental
practices.
WTO Institutions, Transparency, and the Rule of Law
Trade liberalization, even in its narrow conception as
a strategy for economic growth and prosperity,
depends on the rule of law and transparently impartial
and reasonable administrative and judicial
procedures in which public officials are accountable.
The trade policies of a corrupt, opaque, and arbitrary
government that supports lawlessness and corruption
in the private sector inevitably lead to a distorted and
highly insecure market. In such cases, it matters little
even if multilateral trade rules contain provisions that
discipline border controls or address overt
discrimination. Although GATT Article X contains
important transparency provisions, they have rarely
been applied or interpreted in dispute settlement.
Despite its long-standing mandate to deal with
questions of transparency, the WTO has no
institutional expertise in the area. The WTO
institutional isolation from human rights institutions,
among others, has compounded its inability to
address transparency and due process-related
provisions in specific agreements of the WTO. These
include dumping, subsidies, procurement, technical
barriers, and sanitary and phytosanitary agreements.
It is absurd to expect a country that systematically
violates basic human rights to faithfully execute and
implement the processes that the WTO agreements
require. It is necessary to draw on human rights
expertise and accept the evaluations of international
human rights institutions in order to guide the
performance of the WTO in these matters.
Government Procurement
Government procurement policies are important in
the calculation of human rights. There is a
long-standing practice of government procurement
conditionalities related to rights or other social
objectives in a broad range of countries. Christopher
McCrudden, a leading authority on the subject, has
written the following:
The use of public procurement to put such policies
into effect has a long history, most notably in pursuit
of racial and gender equality the Canadian
government has introduced preferential award of
federal contracts to Aboriginal peoples. The South
African government currently uses a system of
"targeted" procurement as part of its policy on social
integration One of the earliest International Labour
Organization conventions (No. 94) requires a linkage
between certain fair labour standards and
government contracts, and this has been widely
ratified. In addition, several European countries have
various different types of policies for achieving
women's equality attached as requirements in the
award of public procurement contracts. 66
The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement
(GPA) provides for National and MFN treatment
when foreign suppliers bid for government
procurement contracts. It also provides that
qualifications that are not essential to ensure the
ability to perform the contract may not be imposed on
suppliers. 67 While on the face of it the MFN
requirement prevents the exclusion of bidders on the
grounds that the government of their country of origin
violates human rights, Article VIII (b) of the GPA
seems to allow the imposition of qualifications based
on human rights performance. It appears, however,
that the qualifications must be made a condition of
the contract itself. That is, they must deal with the
practices of the firm in question, and not the
government of the country of its origin.
The government procurement policies of the State of
Massachusetts in the United States recently gave
prominence to procurement disputes. The state's
procurement laws require that suppliers have no
dealings with Myanmar (Burma). Myanmar's labour
rights record has been the subject of censure by a
resolution of virtually the entire membership of the
ILO. Myanmar is not a party to the GPA but the
European Union was concerned that the
Massachusetts stipulation would prevent European
companies doing business with Myanmar from
bidding on government contracts in Massachusetts.
The EU then commenced dispute settlement
proceedings against the United States at the WTO.
Those proceedings were only suspended when the
United States Court of Appeals upheld a lower court
judgement which found constitutional defects in the
Massachusetts statute. However, the Supreme Court
of the United States has now agreed to hear a final
appeal from the appellate court judgement. If the
Supreme Court reverses its decision, it is possible
that a new WTO action will be commenced against
the Massachusetts scheme.
Even if the Massachusetts law violated some
provisions of the GPA, it might still have been
justified under the exceptions provision of the
Agreement, which allows measures that are, inter
alia, necessary for reasons of public order. This
concept, which is based on the idea of ordre publique
in private international law, relates to the fundamental
public policies of a society, and not merely order in
the sense of civil peace and public security.
McCrudden has suggested that public order should
be interpreted to include the emerging international
public policy of human rights. 68
The GPA will surely be subject to review by the
membership of the WTO in the coming years. In
addition, procurement rules with respect to services
are being negotiated. These will provide opportunities
to further develop the position that human
rights-based procurement conditions are consistent
with WTO law. It is anomalous and unjustifiable that
WTO regulations should force a country to provide
better treatment to foreign bidders than to domestic
enterprises, prohibiting it from imposing on the
former human rights-based requirements that it
routinely imposes on the latter.
The Trade Policy Review Mechanism
The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization codifies a long standing GATT
practice of periodic review of trade policies of
member countries. 69 The review, which is done by the
WTO Secretariat on the basis of information provided
by the WTO member, examines policies and their
impact. A government statement of its policies and
the Secretariat report are then discussed at a WTO
meeting. The "review mechanism enables the regular
appreciation and evaluation of the full range of
individual Members' trade policies and practices and
their impact on the multilateral trading system." 70 Regrettably, these policies and practices are not
evaluated as to their impact on human rights or
compliance with other international commitments.
Democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the
protection of labour rights have generally been
overlooked, although there recently have been
references to "social stability."
The perspective from which the policies of members
are examined needs revision. Currently, the only
issue considered in these examinations is whether a
member's policies and practices support free trade.
It is clear, however, that the perspective through
which a member's policies are reviewed should not
be only that of free trade but rather of the "functioning
of the multilateral trading system." 71 As stated in the
Preamble to the WTO Agreement, the objectives of
this system are not free trade as such but, inter alia,
"ensuring full employment and a large and steadily
growing volume of real income and effective demand"
and "allowing for the optimal use of the world's
resources in accordance with the objective of
sustainable development." 72 International
organizations concerned with human rights, including
labour rights and development, should participate in
the review process at the WTO. They should be
prepared to respond when the reviews do not
appropriately reflect the social and developmental
goals of the multilateral trading system.
The skills and expertise of the WTO Secretariat
responsible for research and report writing must be
addressed if the Trade Policy Review Mechanism
(TPRM) exercises are to properly examine the impact
of trade policy on these other issues. Do the people
who evaluate country reports have the requisite
expertise in democracy and the rule of law, and the
protection of labour rights? The TPRM process can
draw on any "information available to it" instead of
simply relying on data provided by governments. This
would allow the use of information made available by
NGOs and other international organizations such as
the ILO. It is important to establish guidelines for the
provision of information from independent sources
relating to trade and its impact on human rights.
Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights
Intellectual property rights are the first "private rights"
to be protected under the WTO framework. The
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs) was accepted with great
reluctance by many developing countries. They
feared that high levels of intellectual property
protection would not be appropriate to technology
transfer and other social objectives such as the
affordability and availability of essential medicines.
Intellectual property can be understood as a form of
monopoly right. Implicit in the basic understanding of
individual autonomy is some protection of the ability
to obtain compensation for an individual's creative
work. In this construction, the ability to appropriate
the work of others without compensation is an
invitation to exploitation. But the kind or level of
compensation that is fair and appropriate reflects a
balance of values and rights within a society. There
can be no absolute or abstract answers. Some
intellectual property rights may provide undue power
and allow creators the right to determine the price at
which they will share their work with the world.
However, that would be an extreme understanding of
individualism, because in all almost all cases work is
only possible in a social context.
Many of the provisions of TRIPs reflect the views and
demands of countries with powerful industrial lobbies
for high levels of intellectual property protection.
Nevertheless there are some important clauses in the
TRIPs agreement that do suggest an effort to
achieve a more balanced approach. One example is
Article 31 which, in certain circumstances, permits
compulsory licensing of patents, provided certain
conditions are fulfilled, including the provision of
"adequate compensation" to the patent holder. In a
recent dispute, United States business interests
objected to compulsory licensing in South Africa of
medication needed to address the AIDS crisis.
Instead of suing South Africa under WTO law, the
United States exerted pressure in bilateral relations.
To avoid a public relations disaster, the United States
eventually allowed South Africa the option of
compulsory licensing to the extent consistent with
TRIPs. Access to medical care is clearly a human
rights issue, and it would have been unconscionable
for the United States to prevent South Africa from
providing needed drugs. The evolution of a balanced
approach in the existing legal text should be a
precondition for any further elaboration of intellectual
property rights in the WTO context.
The Status of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
The entire human rights corpus is based on the
UDHR, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), the trio of documents referred to as the
International Bill of Human Rights. In its 30 articles,
the UDHR proclaims two broad categories of rights:
these are, on the one hand, civil and political rights,
and, on the other, economic, social and cultural
rights. Although for political and historical reasons the
rights in the ICCPR have received more recognition
than those in the ICESCR, the UDHR treats the two
sets of rights as indivisible, interrelated, and
interdependent. It is, however, a fact that civil and
political rights are more developed jurisprudentially
than economic, social and cultural rights. Critically,
however, trade policies and globalization affect
economic, social and cultural rights, in particular.
Hence the necessity of safeguarding these rights
within the context of the GATT/WTO regime.
The civil and political rights that are provided for in
Articles 3-21 include the rights to life, liberty and the
security of the person; the prohibition against slavery,
torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment;
freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention; the
presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial;
and the freedom of speech, thought, religion, belief,
conscience, assembly, movement and association. In
Articles 22-27, the UDHR provides for economic,
social and cultural rights. These rights include the
right to social security, the right to work, the right to
equal pay for equal work, the right to education, the
right to rest and leisure, the right to security in the
event of disability and unemployment, the right to
health and the right to take part in the cultural life of
the community. The UDHR makes no distinction and
creates no hierarchy among the rights that it
promulgates.
Briefly, the schism in human rights is a product of the
bipolar ideological confrontation between the East
and the West immediately following WWII. While the
Soviet Union and its socialist allies posed as
champions of economic and social rights, the West
touted the primacy of civil and political rights. Soon
after the adoption of the UDHR in 1948, positions
hardened and eventually the UN decided to develop
two separate covenants for the two sets of rights,
each with different institutional and enforcement
mechanisms and strategies. In a reflection of this
ideological bias, many governments and human
rights groups in the West became unsympathetic and
even hostile to the idea of economic and social rights
as "rights." It was argued unsuccessfully by these
opponents that economic and social rights were not
rights but "equities" or "concerns." Further, it was
argued that, unlike civil and political rights, these
rights were not justiciable in courts of law.
In reality, the opposition to economic and social rights
in the West reflects the ideological divisions in the
world that characterized the Cold War era, with social
and economic rights being identified, misleadingly,
with forms of collectivism and redistribution
incompatible with individual liberty and market
economics. One result of this fear was the creation
within the ICCPR of the Human Rights Committee as
its oversight body and the denial of a similar body for
the supervision of the implementation of the ICESCR.
In 1987, the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights was specially established by the UN
Economic and Social Council to monitor the ICESCR.
Importantly, while the ICCPR requires states to
realize their obligations under it immediately, the
ICESCR resorts to the language of gradualism,
asking states to "take steps, individually and through
international assistance and cooperation, especially
economic and technical, to the maximum extent of its
available resources, with a view to realizing
progressively the full realization" of the rights in the
Covenant. This vague and permissive language has
only served as an excuse for governments that are all
too eager to avoid their obligations under ICESCR.
It has been part of UN doctrine that the entire family
of rights--civil and political as well as economic,
social and cultural--are indivisible. The conceptual
interdependence of the two sets of rights is beyond
dispute. At the UN World Conference on Human
Rights held in Vienna in 1993, over 180 countries
affirmed that all human rights are "universal,
indivisible and interdependent and inter-related." The
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action goes
on to assert that "while the significance of national
and regional particularities and various historical,
cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in
mind, it is the duty of states regardless of their
political, economic and cultural systems to promote
all human rights and fundamental freedoms" 73,
Considering the opposition of some states to the
notion of universality, the strength and clarity of this
wording is significant.
The inter-relation of rights can be illustrated by a few
examples. The right to form trade unions, for
example, is guaranteed in the ICESCR, while the
complementary rights to association and assembly
are provided for in the ICCPR. The prohibition
against non-discrimination in relation to the provision
and access to education can be derived from Article
2 of the ICESCR and Article 26 of the ICCPR.
Interpretations of both sets of rights almost always
blur their supposed distinctions. In any event, it is
now widely recognized and accepted that a society
that denies basic social and economic rights cannot
be stable and democratic and respect civil and
political rights. In this connection, global trade should
promote and protect the economic, social and cultural
rights of individuals and communities.
Economic and Social Policies: Food Safety, Technical Barriers and Services
GATT originally provided member states--at least in
theory--with largely unconstrained legal autonomy to
implement domestic economic and social policies.
The only condition was that they not discriminate
against trading partners. GATT Article XX provided
that in the event of a conflict, certain public values,
such as the protection of public morals or human
health, would trump trade rules. Some recent WTO
treaties, however, seek to discipline
non-discriminatory policies and threaten to
undermine the clear hierarchy of values established
by GATT Article XX. One example is the Agreement
on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS),
which governs domestic food safety regulations, and
which has loomed large in the US-EU dispute around
hormone-treated beef. Where a WTO member seeks
to apply more stringent regulations than what is
provided by international standards, its regulations
must meet a range of criteria. Such regulation must
be based on a scientific assessment of risk and must,
even if non-discriminatory, be the least
trade-restrictive standard available to achieve the
level of risk that the member deems acceptable.
Domestic product regulations are also controlled
under the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement
(TBT), which requires that such regulations "not be
more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfil a
legitimate objective, taking account of the risks
non-fulfilment would create." 74 These legitimate
objectives are, inter alia, national security
requirements, the prevention of deceptive practices,
protection of human health or safety, animal or plant
life or health, or the environment. 75
Some trade experts have taken the reference to
"taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would
create" to mean a balancing or proportionality test.
Here, the trade restrictive effects of a regulation are
weighed against the social and economic benefits
resulting from a given reduction of risk. This
interpretation, if adopted in dispute settlement, would
constitute a fundamental departure from the
hierarchy of norms stated in GATT Article XX. The
obligation to implement social and economic rights
lies with national governments under the relevant
international instruments. However, the ability to do
so through national social and economic regulation
would be subject to the WTO dispute settlement
organs, which would second guess the trade-offs
made in such a regulation concerning acceptable
risks. The SPS requirement for scientific risk
assessment has been said to require that regulations
must be based on a cost-benefit analysis. This is the
sort of technique that was used ideologically in the
1980s by some developed countries to scale back
social, economic and environmental regulations.
In the case of the SPS Agreement, however, the
Appellate Body seems to prefer an interpretative
approach which recognizes that the social
responsibilities of governments should not be lightly
interfered with by trade law. In the Hormones 76 case,
the Appellate Body found that the European
Community had not met a certain minimum threshold
of scientific justification for its ban on cattle treated
with synthetic hormones. It also said that this
threshold should not be set in a way that frustrates
the ability of governments to meet their
responsibilities to protect their citizens. The Appellate
Body held, for example, that governments could act
on the basis of views other than mainstream
scientific opinions. Ultimately, the decision about
which scientific views were sound would rest on
government as part of its responsibilities to the
people.
The Appellate Body suggested, further, that scientific
risk assessments could include real world
considerations of enforcement and monitoring that do
not arise under laboratory conditions but relate
directly to the social responsibilities of governments.
It stated as follows:
It is essential to bear in mind that the risk that is to be
evaluated is not only risk ascertainable in a
scientific laboratory under strictly controlled
conditions, but also risk in human societies as they
actually exist, in other words, the actual potential for
adverse effects on human health in the real world
where people live and work and die. 77
These indications of sensitivity to the economic and
social responsibilities of governments would be
greatly reinforced by an explicit understanding among
WTO members that the rights and obligations
contained in the SPS and TBT Agreements are
subject to the overriding norms already explicit or
implicit in Article XX of the GATT.
Other economic and social rights issues emerge in
relation to trade in services. Opening up service
markets to global competition through multilateral
trade rules has been closely linked to the elimination
of domestic monopoly provision of many services.
Telecommunications and transportation services are
examples. However, monopoly provision of certain
services has often been done by a state enterprise
with specific social and economic goals. These have
included universal access to basic services and
non-discrimination.
Anti-competitive monopolies or oligopolies have at
times led to high prices and poor service for ordinary
citizens. It would, however, be wrong to conclude that
the shift to competition necessarily enhances access
to basic services. The real question is the extent to
which WTO rules actually limit, in intent or effect, the
ability of governments to impose social obligations on
foreign and competitive domestic service providers.
Governments are responsible for the implementation
of social and economic rights and bear the obligation
to make certain services available at an affordable
cost.
The General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS) forecasts new disciplinary measures that
would limit even non-discriminatory requirements that
governments impose on service providers. These
disciplinary measures would ensure that such
requirements "do not constitute unnecessary barriers
to trade in services." 78 This provision seems to
recognize only those requirements that ensure the
quality of a service as legitimate. There is no
recognition of the legitimacy of requirements related
to human rights. There should be an implicit view that
putting requirements on service providers is a
legitimate means of achieving redistributive goals. A
Working Party on Domestic Regulation is expected to
complete work on possible disciplines under GATS
Article VI at the end of 2000. The resulting agreement
should contain a clear statement of the precedence
of human rights, including economic and social rights,
over any such disciplines. This will be especially
important as efforts intensify to induce members to
make specific commitments to market access in
more sectors, such as health and education, where
policy goals related to human rights are obvious.
Ending the Institutional Isolationism of the WTO
This paper noted at the beginning that GATT evolved
in isolation from other multilateral institutions of global
governance such as the United Nations and World
Bank. However, the approach to treaty interpretation
and dispute settlement since the creation of the
World Trade Organization in 1994, and developed by
the Appellate Body since then, seeks rightly to
interpret WTO law in light of the broader framework
of international law. This must explicitly and
consistently include international human rights law.
So far, however, interpretation has not been profound
and has not expanded institutional relationships
across the various regimes of international law and
global governance. Despite some formal ties with the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO),
inclusion of IMF views in certain disputes concerning
balance of payments-related trade restrictions, and
reference to collaboration between the ILO and the
WTO in the Singapore Declaration, there has been
virtually no serious dialogue or interaction between
the WTO as an institution and other relevant
international institutions. The only collaborative effort
in recent times worthy of note is with the World Bank,
on a trade and development website. This record is
appalling.
The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization states that the "General Council
shall make appropriate arrangements for effective
cooperation with other intergovernmental
organizations that have responsibilities related to
those of the WTO." 79 The word "shall" in this
provision means that it is a formal obligation of the
treaty for the membership, through the General
Council, to make such arrangement for "effective"
cooperation. The implementation of this obligation
should be a subject of formal review. As an initial
step in this review, the views of relevant international
organizations and NGOs should be solicited and
given considerable weight.
At the end of January 2000, a new initiative of the
United Nations was inaugurated -- the Global
Compact -- to link businesses, citizens and certain
international agencies in a dialogue concerning
labour issues, environmental protection and human
rights. 80 The intergovernmental institutions involved
in this effort include the International Labour
Organization, the United Nations Environmental
Programme, and the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights. It is highly regrettable that the World
Trade Organization is not involved -- indeed the
launching of such an initiative without its participation
is very discouraging, as it suggests that such a
dialogue can legitimately and satisfactorily take place
without the WTO participating.
Conclusion
As we consider the evolution of international trade
law in its relationship to the existing legal regime
governing human rights, we are confronted with a
number of dilemmas and few definitive solutions.
Trade law is basically treaty law. Its interpretation
must be taken into account and be consistent with
the hierarchy of norms in international law, reflecting
for instance the status of some human rights as
preemptory norms, erga omnes. When trade law is
interpreted in this manner, there need not be any
conflict between trade law and human rights law. This
does not mean that the general impact of trade
liberalization, when taken in its dynamic relationship
to other phenomena connected to globalization, such
as free capital movements, and the tendency of the
international financial institutions to prescribe
deregulatory answers to basic questions of social and
economic development, may not have negative
effects on human rights. This is the perspective
through which governments and civil society should
address the problems of uneven development,
particularly in cases and controversies where there is
no specific conflict of legal rights and obligations as
such.
Trade law itself should be interpreted and evolved in
a manner consistent with the hierarchy of norms in
international law generally, where many basic human
rights have the status of custom, general principles,
or erga omnes obligations, which would normally
prevail over specific provisions of a trade treaty,
assuming an actual conflict. When properly
interpreted and applied, the trade regime recognizes
that human values related to human rights are
fundamental and prior to free trade itself, which is
merely an instrument of basic human values. The
primacy of human rights over trade liberalization is
consistent with the trade regime on its own terms.
The institutions that are the official guardians of trade
law pose formidable barriers to the proper and full
realization of this insight.
Although we find there to be an absence of such legal
conflict in the classic sense, there is nevertheless a
need for institutional evolution in the international
system, a need to understand the effects of trade
laws and policies in the broadest sense, and a need
to evolve new laws and policies in a manner that
overcomes the post-war legacy of isolation between
human rights institutions and economic institutions,
including those preoccupied with the trading system.
We, therefore, offer this paper as a contribution to
the growing body of research seeking to respond to
those needs.
Endnotes
1 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 55 UNTS 194 (the original GATT Agreement) [hereinafter GATT]. This was amended by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994. See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Resolution 217 A(III), UN Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. The UDHR is the founding document of the modern international human rights movement. Return
2 The Bretton Woods System includes the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the GATT. See LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND TEXT 1 (John H. Jackson, William J. Davey, & Alan O. Sykes, Jr., eds., West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minneapolis, 1996). Return
3 The efforts to establish the ITO were dropped when it was opposed by isolationists in the Senate of the United States of America. Id., at 293-95. Return
4 See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, signed in Marrakesh, April 15, 1994. Return
5 UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/9-26 November 1999. Return
6 See, for example, Caroline M. Robb, CAN THE POOR INFLUENCE POLICY? World Bank: 1998; Stephan Haggard & Steven B. Webb, eds., THE WORLD BANK PARTICIPATION SOURCEBOOK,
World Bank: 1996. Return
7 Makau wa Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA. J. INT'L L., 589, 589-90 (1996). Return
8 Louis Henkin, THE AGE OF RIGHTS ix (1990). Return
9 Id. Return
10 Philip Alston, Making Space for New Human Rights: the Case of the Right to Development, I HARV. HUM. RTS. Y. B. 3, 3 (1988). Return
11 Henry J. Steiner, Political Participation as a Human Right, 1 HARV. HUM. RTS. Y. B. 77, 79 (1988). Return
12 Kurt Mills, Reconstructing Sovereignty: a Human Rights Perspective, 15 NETH. HUM. RTS. Q. 276 (1997). See also Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 117-165 (1996). Return
13 The UDHR provides, in part, that the "will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government." Article 21(3), UDHR, supra note 1. Return
14 Both the ICCPR and the ICESCR buttress the
concept of popular sovereignty by their self-determination clause, common Article 1, which can be read as giving citizens their right to "internal" self-determination, that is the right to a democratic state based on the freely expressed will of citizens. Article 1, ICCPR, GA Res. 2200 (XXI), UN GAOR, 21 st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force March 23, 1976). Article 1, ICESCR, GA Res. 2200A (XXI), UN GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 UNTS (entered into force January 3, 1976). Return
15 See generally John Locke, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 1988). Return
16 E.C. Stowell, INTERVENTION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1921). Return
17 C.W. Jenks, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS (1960). Return
18 Hurst Hannum, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DETERMINATION (1990). Return
19 Article 55(a), UN Charter. Return
20 Id., Article 55(c). Return
21 Id., Article 68. Return
22 Id. Return
23 Id., Article 56. Return
24 Id.,
Preamble. Return
25 Id., Article 1(3). Return
26 The term "human rights" appears in the UN
Charter in the following key important provisions: ¶ 2 of the Preamble, Article 1(3), Article 13(1)(b), Arts. 55 and 56, Article 62(2), and Article 68. UN Charter, Id. Return
27 See Article 38, Statute of the International Court of Justice listing sources of international law. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, ¶ 102 (1986). Return
28 Id. Return
29 Restatement, supra note 27, ¶ 702. Return
30 Id. Return
31 Id. Return
32 Id. Return
33 Article 53, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, UN Doc. A/CONF.39/27, reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969). Return
34 Id., Article 64. Return
35 THE CASE CONCERNING THE BARCELONA TRACTION, LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY, LIMITED (New Application 1962) (Belgium v. Spain), [1970] I.C.J. Rep. 4, at ¶ 33-4. Return
36 See, for example, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts, eds., 1992). Return
37 The Protection of Human Rights and the Principle of Non-Intervention in Internal Affairs of States, 63 INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ANNUAIRE 338 (1989). Return
38 Preamble, UDHR, supra note 1. Return
39 See Thomas Buergenthal, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 29-38 (1995). Return
40 Mary Ann Glendon, Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1153 (1998). Return
41 See Article XX, GATT, supra note 1. Return
42 Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, Report of the Panel, (1990) 37 BISD 200. See "http://www.wto.org" Return
43 United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (1991) 30 I.L.M. 1594; United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, (143994) 33 I.L.M. 936. See also http://www.earthjustice.org Return
44 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 34. Article 3 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding states that the Dispute Settlement System of the WTO serves "to clarify the existing provisions of the [WTO] Agreements in accordance with the customary rules of interpretation of public international law." In two early cases, the Appellate Body of the WTO held that Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, discussed below, constituted "customary rules of interpretation of public international law" within the meaning of Article 3 of the DSU. Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS8, 10-11/AB./R (October 4, 1996), AB-1996-2; United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS2/AB/R (May 20, 1996). Return
45 Article 31(3)(c), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Id. Return
46 United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R (October 12, 1998). Return
47 Article 31, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 45. Return
48 See Amartya Sen, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 3-4, 10-11 (New York: Knopf, 1999). Return
49 Article 1, GATT, supra note 1. Return
50 Id., Article III. Return
51 Such permissible prohibitions or restrictions include duties, taxes, quotas, import and export licenses or other measures. Id., Article XI (1). Return
52 Id., Article XX. Return
53 Id. Return
54 (1992), ICJ Rep. 3, 15, at ¶ 39. Return
55 It provides, in part, that the "[c]ontracting parties may consult with contracting parties, with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations and with any appropriate intergovernmental organization in cases where they consider such consultation necessary." Article XXIII(2), GATT, supra note 1. Return
56 Article V(2), Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization provides that the General Council "shall make appropriate arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-governmental organizations concerned with matters related to those of the WTO." Return
57 For specific information on public participation in the international trading system, see ACCREDITATION SCHEMES AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL FORA, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, 1999. Return
58 Article 2, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, International Labour Conference, 86th Session, Geneva, 1998. Return
59 OECD, TRADE, EMPLOYMENT, AND LABOUR STANDARDS: A STUDY OF CORE WORKERS' RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1996). Return
60 Id., at 40. Return
61 Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (December 13, 1996), Singapore Ministerial Declaration, adopted December 13, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 218 (1997). Return
62 Id. Return
63 Id. Return
64 United States Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, January 16, 1989, 36 BISD 345 (1989). See R. Howse and D. Regan, The Product/Process Distinction: An Illusory Basis for Disciplining Unilateralism in Trade Policy. EUR. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2000/2). Return
65 For the human rights implications of this provision, see S. Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in GATT, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 689 (1998). See also R. Howse, The World Trade Organization and the Protection of Workers' Rights, 3 JOURNAL OF SMALL AND EMERGING BUSINESS LAW 131 (1999). Return
66 C. McCrudden, International Economic Law and the Pursuit of Human Rights: A Framework for Discussion of 'Selective Purchasing' Laws under the WTO Government Procurement Agreement, 3 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 8 (1999). Return
67 Article VIII (b), WTO Government Procurement Agreement. Return
68 Supra note 66, at 41-42. Return
69 Annex 3, WTO Agreement, supra note 4. Return
70 Id. Return
71 Id. Return
72 The WTO Agreement, supra note 4. Return
73 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN World Conference on Human Rights, June 1993. Return
74 WTO Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement. Return
75 Id., Article 2(2). Return
76 EC-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS26/AB/R (January 16, 1998). Return
77 Id. Return
78 Article VI(3), General Agreement on Services. Return
79 Article V, WTO Agreement, supra note 4. Return
80 For a full description of the Global Compact Initiative, see http://www.unglobalcompact.org Return
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